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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred by Utah Code 
§78-2-2(3) (j) and §78-2a-3(2)(j) (1953, as amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW/STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for review by American on its cross-
appeal are: 
1. Did the trial court err in failing to award attorney's 
fees and certain court costs to New West Federal Savings and Loan 
Association ("New West")? 
2. Did the trial court err in failing to find USLife Title 
Insurance Company ("USLife") and Guardian Title Company 
("Guardian") liable for punitive damages, reserving the issue of 
the financial condition of USLife and Guardian and the ultimate 
amount of punitive damages for future factual determination? 
The standard of review for issues determined by summary 
judgment is set forth in English v. Kienke, 774 P2d 1154 (Utah 
App 1989) : 
Our analytical standard for review of a summary judgment is 
the same as that of the trial court: we review the facts and 
inferences from those facts in a light most favorable to the 
losing party. If we conclude that a genuine issue of material 
fact exists, the summary judgment will be overturned and the 
case remanded for further proceedings on that issue. Where 
no material facts remain unresolved, we examine the trial 
court's conclusions of law and review them for correctness. 
English v. Kienke at 1156, citations omitted. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Statutes and rules whose interpretation is determinative are: 
1. Utah Code Ann. S31A-20-110(1). 
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4. Utah Code Ann. §31A-23-308. 
5. Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56. 
6. Utah Rules of Civ. Pro., Rule 56(c). 
Copies of these statutes and rules are included within the 
addendum hereto as Exhibits "A" to "F", respectively. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action against USLife, a title insurance 
underwriter, and Guardian, a title insurance agent who issued an 
ALTA lenders policy to American Savings and Loan Association 
("American"). The policy insured American's trust deed in a first 
position priority. American's trust deed was subsequently 
foreclosed by Scenic Rail Credit Union ("Scenic Rail") whose trust 
deed was senior to American's trust deed. A claim was submitted 
to USLife and Guardian and it was denied. American sued USLife and 
Guardian under various contractual theories and tort theories, both 
under the policy and outside the policy. The trial court granted 
American's summary judgment on the issues of liability and damages 
but denied American's request for attorney's fees, punitive damages 
and certain court costs. This summary judgment is being appealed 
by USLife and Guardian and cross-appealed as to attorney's fees, 
punitive damages and court costs by American. 
Because of a supervised reorganization of American by the 
federal government, the plaintiff was changed from American to New 
West just prior to appeal. Further, USLife was placed under a 
state supervised receiver/liquidator in Texas shortly after its 
appeal was commenced. By order of this court, the 
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receiver/liquidator, Mr. Stephen S. Durish, was substituted as a 
party for USLife. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. M. Lynn Strong and Cherie G. Strong (the " Strongs") owned 
a single family residence located at 7629 South 835 East, Midvale, 
Utah (the "property"). [Record, page 375.] 
2. On December 30, 1983, the Strongs obtained a loan in the 
amount of $31,300.00 from Scenic Rail. Scenic Rail secured the 
loan with a trust deed on the property which trust deed was 
entitled "Second Trust Deed". This trust deed was recorded on 
February 14, 1984 in the Salt Lake County Recorder's office. 
[Record, page 376.] 
3. The Strongs thereafter approached FCA Mortgage 
Corporation, ("FCA") for a loan. FCA was acting on behalf of its 
parent American. The loan from American was to be for $81,400.00 
with interest at 12.75% per annum and was to be secured by a first 
trust deed on the property. [Record, page 376.] 
4. Guardian Title Company of Utah ("Guardian") is a Utah 
Corporation, doing business in Utah as a duly qualified and 
authorized title agent. [Record, page 376.] 
5. Guardian represented USLife Title Insurance Company of 
Dallas, aka Title USA Insurance Company, ("USLife") as its agent. 
Guardian and USLife had executed a CONTRACT OF AGENCY, a copy of 
which contract is included within the addendum hereto as Exhibit 
"J". This contract provided that Guardian had the authority to do 
the following: 
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a. to issue title insurance commitments and title 
insurance policies up to a $300,000.00 policy limit on behalf of 
USLife (Section I); 
b. to examine the title of the property insured to 
determine any and all express exceptions and exclusions from the 
policy such as the Scenic Rail trust deed (Section II); 
c. to correctly reflect the condition of the title on 
the title insurance commitments and title policies (Section III); 
d. to collect premiums and pay USLife its share of 20% 
as an "underwriting risk" premium (Sections IV & V ) ; and 
e. to properly and regularly close the transaction on 
which the commitment or policy was predicated (Section V). 
[Record, page 37 7.] 
6. Guardian and USLife were selected to examine the state of 
the title on the property, to close the loan between the Strongs 
and American, to act as escrow and closing agent, to take 
possession of $81,400.00 in loan proceeds from American, to 
disburse the proceeds according to written escrow/closing 
instructions from American, and to issue a title policy for 
$81,400.00 insuring American's trust deed in first position against 
the property. The closing was held and Guardian recorded 
American's trust deed on March 14, 1984 in the records of the Salt 
Lake County Recorder's office. On or about March 23, 1984, 
Guardian and USLife issued a title policy insuring American's trust 
deed in first position, a copy of said policy is included within 
the addendum to Guardian's brief [Record, page 37 7.] 
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7. The closing, escrow and disbursal of loan proceeds were 
governed by written escrow instructions from American to Guardian 
and USLife that the policy was to insure the American trust deed 
as a "first and paramount lien of record" and that Guardian was to 
"pay off any and all liens on the subject property" ahead of 
American's trust deed. The instructions were received and 
acknowledged in writing by Guardian's escrow/closing officer, Ms. 
Fay Anderson. [Record, page 378.] 
8. During the title search of the property and prior to 
closing, Guardian became aware of the Scenic Rail loan and trust 
deed, and that, even though it was entitled "Second Trust Deed", 
it was superior to the trust deed of American that would be 
recorded at closing. [Record, page 37 9; Anderson deposition pp 45 
& 46; Killpack deposition p. 22.] 
9. Notwithstanding the clear escrow/closing instructions of 
American, Guardian and USLife closed the American loan even though 
the Scenic Rail trust deed remained of record and superior in 
priority to American's trust deed. Guardian's closing officer, Ms. 
Anderson knew that the Scenic Rail trust deed needed to be paid off 
from American's loan proceeds, but failed to do so. Thereafter, 
the title policy showing American in a first priority position, 
without any mention of the Scenic Rail trust deed, was issued by 
Guardian and USLife on or about March 23, 1984. However, prior 
to signing the policy, Ms. Anderson became aware that the loan 
proceeds from American, that should have been used to pay off 
Scenic Rail, were mistakenly disbursed by her office to the 
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Strongs. The Scenic Rail trust deed had not been paid off. Ms 
Anderson advised her superiors, including Ms. Killpack, Guardian's 
Vice President and Office Manager, and Mr. Warren Curlis, 
Guardian's President and Owner. These individuals, as employees 
of Guardian, and as agent of USLife, consciously chose to issue and 
sign the title policy showing American in first position. They did 
so clearly aware of their liability to American and the fact that 
the representation in the policy that American was in first 
position was a false representation. The policy was signed and 
sent to American in Stockton, California showing its Trust Deed in 
a first position and not mentioning in any manner whatsoever the 
Scenic Rail trust deed. [Record, page 379; Anderson deposition pp 
51-54 and Exhibit 8 of said deposition.] 
10. American was under the belief that the loan was closed 
as it had instructed, i.e., that its trust deed was in a first 
priority position. USLife, its agent Guardian, and Guardian's 
officers and employees, chose not to advise American that its trust 
deed was in second priority behind Scenic Rail for they realized 
Guardian and USLife were liable to American under the policy. 
[Record, page 350; Anderson deposition pp 53, 62 & 63; Killpack 
deposition pp 30-32.] 
11. Guardian and USLife then contacted the Strongs to push 
their payment of the Scenic Rail trust deed, and contacted Scenic 
Rail to obtain a subordination agreement. The Strongs told 
Guardian that they could not immediately pay off the Scenic Rail 
trust deed because the windfall they had mistakenly received at 
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closing had been put into "investments"• Scenic Rail refused to 
sign a subordination agreement because the property was not worth 
enough to secure both the American loan and its loan. These 
conversations took place for approximately one to two months after 
the closing, i.e., April and May of 1984. [Record, page 350; 
Anderson deposition pp 54-61; Killpack deposition pp 24-28.] 
12. After this initial effort, no further attempt was made 
by Guardian or USLife to resolve the problem or to notify American 
of the problem. No one at Guardian felt it was their 
responsibility to obtain release of the Scenic Rail trust deed. 
Nor was there any attempt to monitor the Strong's timely payment 
of the monthly installments under the Scenic Rail note and trust 
deed. (Record, page 381; Anderson deposition pp 61-63; Killpack 
deposition pp 24-31.] 
13. Notwithstanding the fact that Guardian and USLife knew 
that they could have recorded a REQUEST FOR NOTICE pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §57-1-26, requesting notice of any foreclosure proceeding 
by Scenic Rail, they failed to do so. Instead, Guardian and USLife 
concluded that if Scenic Rail foreclosed, they would rely upon 
American to contact them and advise them of the foreclosure. Yet, 
Guardian and USLife refused to notify American of the Scenic Rail 
trust deed so that American would have an idea that such a 
foreclosure was a possibility. [Record, page 381; Killpack 
deposition pp 28-31.] 
14. On February 1, 1986, the Strongs defaulted on their loan 
with American. At that time, the balance due to American was 
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$80,939.35 principal, together with accrued interest and a reserve 
fund shortage of $1,712.16. [Record, page 382.] 
15. On August 8, 1986, the Strongs filed a Chapter 7 
Bankruptcy petition and obtained a full discharge of their debts 
without payment of dividends to any unsecured creditors or to 
American. [Record, page 382.] 
16. Shortly after the default of the Strongs on American's 
loan, American commenced foreclosure against the property. The 
foreclosure was stayed by the Strong's bankruptcy. In conjunction 
with the foreclosure, American's Trustee, Mr. Lester A. Perry, then 
of Kirton, McConkie and Bushnell, obtained a foreclosure report 
from another title company listing the Scenic Rail trust deed as 
a "Second Trust Deed". A closer review of the foreclosure report 
would have revealed that the recording date of the Scenic Rail 
trust deed was prior to the recording date of American's Trust 
Deed. However, this fact was not noticed because the trust deed 
was listed as a "Second Trust Deed" and an inspection of the USLife 
title policy indicated that American's Trust Deed was in a first 
position with no mention of the Scenic Rail trust deed. It was 
believed that the Scenic Rail trust deed was in fact a second trust 
deed. [Record, page 382.] 
17. The Strongs also defaulted on their loan with Scenic Rail 
and foreclosure was commenced on this trust deed by recording a 
notice of default on October 20, 1986. The Strongs bankruptcy also 
delayed completion of the Scenic Rail foreclosure. A notice of 
default and notice of sale were prepared and recorded by Scenic 
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Rail's Trustee and the property was sold at Trustees sale for 
$30,000.00 on February 3, 1987 to United Bond Finance Corp. 
("United Bond"). [Record, page 383.] 
18. American received copies of the Scenic Rail notice of 
default and notice of sale. The office of American's Trustee 
checked the title policy issued by Guardian and USLife and 
determined that American's Trust Deed was in first position. Thus, 
the Trustee and American believed that a second trust deed or 
junior trust deed was foreclosing and American's trust deed was not 
in jeopardy. [Record, page 383.] 
19. During American's foreclosure, American was notified by 
a third party title company that its interest had been foreclosed 
out by Scenic Rail. American immediately notified Guardian and 
USLife by letter dated March 9, 1987, of the Scenic Rail 
foreclosure and demanded payment of the full amount of the title 
policy plus interest because of the complete failure of American's 
trust deed. [Record, page 384]. 
20. Guardian and USLife refused to pay any sums to American. 
After this lawsuit was commenced, USLife offered a judgment for 
$27,131.19. However, acceptance of this judgment was conditioned 
upon settlement in full by American. Approximately one (1) year 
after this lawsuit was filed, Guardian and USLife paid American 
$29,957.30 without condition. [Record, page 384.] 
21. Shortly after March 9, 1987, Mr. L. Benson Mabey, a Utah 
attorney, called American's counsel to discuss the claim made by 
American. Mr. Mabey indicated that he felt it would be prudent for 
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him as counsel for American, to file a state court action to set 
aside the Scenic Rail trustee's sale and to file an objection in 
the Strong's bankruptcy to reopen the bankruptcy and object to the 
discharge of American's debt. During the course of several 
conversations between March 9, 1987 and March 18, 1987, Mr. Mabey 
and American's Trustee, Mr. Perry, fully discussed the facts that 
were then unfolding. They also considered strategy and legal 
theories of recovery. These discussions were held because of the 
express representation of Mr. Mabey that he was the title company's 
attorney hired to represent American. Mr. Mabey filed the state 
court action and the motion to reopen the Strong's bankruptcy 
purporting to represent American. Mr. Mabey confirmed his legal 
representation of American as its attorney by letter of March 13, 
1987 to Ms. Leila Brand, an employee and officer of American. A 
copy of said letter is included in the addendum hereto as Exhibit 
"G". [Record, page 384.] 
22. On April 17, 1987, Mr. John T. Anderson sent a letter to 
Ms. Brand, a copy of which is included in the addendum hereto as 
Exhibit "H", indicating that he represented the title insurer and 
that Mr. Mabey was not authorized to represent American. This 
letter was one month after full and open discussions between Mr. 
Perry and Mr. Mabey concerning the facts and legal strategy of 
American. Mr. Anderson, thereafter, required Mr. Mabey to dismiss 
the state court action and cease any and all representation of 
American in either the state court or bankruptcy actions. [Record, 
page 385.] 
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23. On July 6, 1987 Mr. Anderson sent a letter to Mr. Perry's 
law firm denying coverage of American's trust deed under the 
policy. This denial was expressly based upon the discussions held 
between Mr. Mabey and Mr. Perry while Mr. Mabey purported to 
represent American. A copy of Mr. Anderson's letter is contained 
within the addendum hereto as Exhibit "I". American filed the 
present law suit and Mr. Mabey and Mr. Anderson appeared as counsel 
for the defendants, Guardian and USLife. [Record, page 385.] 
24. The amount due to American under the Strong loan on 
February 1, 19 86, the date the Strongs defaulted under their loan, 
was $82,651.51 including interest, late fees, and reserve shortage. 
The amount due to American on the date that Scenic Rail completed 
its foreclosure, February 23, 1987, was $95,380.15, including 
interest, late fees and reserve shortage. [Record, page 386.] 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Guardian argues that American is limited to contractual 
theories of recovery under the title policy. Guardian further 
argues that as such, it is not liable for its actions. However, 
American's claims are not limited to contractual theories and 
Guardian is responsible for its actions that breached express and 
implied contractual duties and tort duties. 
Guardian argues that as a contract of indemnity, the title 
policy was not breached. However, the title was breached even if 
it was construed as a contract of indemnity. In addition, the 
title policy is a contract of warranty and was clearly breached by 
the actions of Guardian and USLife. 
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Guardian ignores the fact that its actions and the actions of 
USLife are undisputed and constitute prima facia causes of action 
for breach of various noncontract duties based in tort, fraud, and 
various statutory duties. 
Damages should be measured from the date the loan was closed 
which is the date all contract and tort duties were breached, which 
damages are the amount due under the loan made by American plus 
interest, less any payments towards the loan. American could not 
mitigate its damages and owed Guardian and USLife no duty to notify 
them of the Scenic Rail trust deed under the circumstances. 
The trial court errored in not awarding reasonable attorneys fees 
and in not finding Guardian and USLife liable for punitive damages 
reserving the factual issue of their financial condition and the 
amount of punitive damages for further evidentiary hearings. 
This court should affirm the judgement of the trial court as 
to compensatory damages and reverse the trial court's decision as 
to attorneys fees and punitive damages remanding this action for 
a factual determination of the proper amount of attorney's fees and 
punitive damages. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CLAIMS OF AMERICAN AGAINST GUARDIAN AND 
USLIFE ARE NOT LIMITED TO CONTRACTUAL THEORIES 
OF RECOVERY BASED UPON THE TITLE POLICY, AND 
GUARDIAN IS LIABLE FOR ITS BREACH OF 
CONTRACTUAL AND TORT DUTIES OWED TO AMERICAN. 
Guardian argues that the claims of American must be limited 
to contractual theories of recovery found within the title policy. 
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All other theories outside of the contract must fail, whether 
sounding in tort, fraud, implied contract, etc. Guardian goes on 
to argue that since American's claims are limited to the title 
policy, Guardian, as the agent, has no duty to perform the 
obligations of its principle, USLife, under the title policy. 
[Point I and Point II of Guardian's argument.] 
A, BECK V, FARMER'S INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 701 
P. 2d 795 (Utah 1985) DOES NOT LIMIT AMERICAN'S 
CLAIMS TO BREACH OF CONTRACT UNDER THE TITLE 
POLICY. 
Guardian relies upon the case of Beck v. Farmer's Insurance 
Exchange, 701 P. 2d 795 (Utah 1985) for the proposition that a first 
party relationship between an insurer and an insured is contractual 
rather than fiduciary. Thus, Guardian concludes that any claim by 
the insured must only be based upon the contract of insurance. 
Beck simply does not limit the insured's claims to breach of 
contract theories under the insurance policy. The recent case of 
Culp Construction Company v. Buildmart Mall, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 
No. 880388 (Utah 1990) sites footnote three of Beck for the 
proposition that: 
We [the Justices of the Supreme Court for the 
State of Utah] recognize that in some cases 
the acts constituting a breach of contract may 
also result in breaches of duty that are 
independent of the contract and may give rise 
to causes of action in tort. 
Culp Construction Company v. Buildmart Mall, at 6, citations 
omitted. 
The Culp case is particularly germane to the issues presented 
by Guardian because of the similarity of its facts to the case 
14 
presented in this appeal. In CUJJD, Tower Federal Savings and Loan 
Association was issued a lender's policy by Richmond Title Co. as 
agent, and Lawyer's Title Insurance Corp,, as insurer. The policy 
was issued pursuant to escrow instructions that required the Tower 
trust deed to be "in a second lien position behind [First Security 
Bank]" before the loan proceeds were disbursed. The loan was 
closed and Tower, unfortunately, found itself behind many mechanics 
liens in addition to First Security Bank's trust deed. Tower sued 
the insurer and its agent under contractual theories and for 
negligent misrepresentation. 
The Utah Supreme Court considered the issue of whether Beck 
limited the insured's action against the title insurer and its 
agent to the contract of insurance. The Court held that Beck did 
not so limit the insured's claims, and specifically reinstated the 
claim for negligent misrepresentation. In dicta, the Court also 
suggested that the title agent may have assumed the duties of an 
abstractor by researching the property's title and issuing an 
incorrect and false title commitment and subsequent policy in the 
face of very specific escrow instructions. 
Beck and Culp, clearly allow American's claims based on tort 
and implied contract theories outside the title policy. 
B. GUARDIAN CANNOT CLAIM THE BENEFIT OF ANY 
LIMITATION OF REMEDIES TO BREACH OF CONTRACT 
THEORIES UNDER THE TITLE POLICY. 
In another critical step in Guardian's argument, it claims 
the benefit of paragraph 11 of the title policy which states: 
11. LIABILITY LIMITED TO THIS POLICY 
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This instrument together with all endorsements 
and other instruments, if any, attached hereto 
by the Company is the entire policy and 
contract between the insured and the Company, 
Any claim of loss or damage, whether or not 
based on negligence, and which arises out of 
the status of the lien of the insured mortgage 
or of the title to the estate or interest 
covered hereby or any action asserting such 
claim shall be restricted to the provisions 
and conditions and stipulations of this 
policy, [Emphasis added,] 
However, the title policy defines "the Company" as USLife, 
not Guardian. Further, in its argument, Guardian maintains that it 
is not a party to the title policy. Thus, no protection is 
afforded Guardian by this contractual language. 
C. THE LIMITATION IN THE TITLE POLICY TO 
ONLY CONTRACT THEORIES OF RECOVERY IS NOT 
ENFORCEABLE AND DOES NOT LIMIT AMERICAN'S 
REMEDIES TO BREACH OF CONTRACT THEORIES. 
The courts have not supported exculpatory language similar to 
paragraph 11 of the policy. Seeking to protect the insured, courts 
have generally construed exculpatory language against the insurer. 
A title insurer is engaged in a business "effected with the public 
interest and cannot by an adhesion contract, exculpate itself from 
liability for negligence." White v. Western Title Insurance Co., 
40 Cal. 3rd 882, at 884, citing Akin v. Business Title Corp., 264 
Cal. App. 2d 153, 70 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1968); cf. L. Smirlock Realty 
Corp. v. Title Guarantee Co., 437 N.Y.S.2d. 57, 52 N.Y.2d 182 (N.Y. 
Ct. App. 1981). 
Finally, in the Culp case, the Utah Supreme Court remanded 
the action for trial on several issues, including whether the title 
agent and insurer were liable for the non-contract theory of 
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negligent misrepresentation. This was done even though the Culp 
title policy contained a provision which was verbatim to Paragraph 
11 of the USLife title policy in the present case (the Culp title 
policy is Exhibit E to appellant's brief Culp Construction v. 
Buildmart Ma111. 
D. THE LIMITATION IN THE TITLE POLICY TO 
ONLY CONTRACT THEORIES OF RECOVERY DOES NOT 
PROHIBIT ACTIONS BASED UPON BREACH OF 
STATUTORY DUTIES. 
USLife and Guardian breached several statutory duties. 
Specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-308 provides: 
Any title company, represented by one or more 
title insurance agents, is directly and 
primarily liable to others dealing with the 
title insurance agents for the receipt and 
disbursement of funds deposited in escrows, 
closings, or settlements with the title 
insurance agents in all those transactions 
where a commitment or binder for a policy or 
contract of title insurance of that title 
insurance company has been ordered, or a 
preliminary report of the title insurance 
company has been issued or distributed. This 
liability does not modify, mitigate, impair, 
or affect the contractual obligations between 
the title insurance agents and the title 
insurance company. [Emphasis added] 
USLife and Guardian were directly and primarily liable for 
the receipt and disbursement of the funds deposited in escrow by 
American and misapplied by Guardian contrary to the explicit escrow 
instructions of American. 
Guardian was licensed under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-
201(1)(1985) . As such, Guardian was bound to the duties owed the 
public under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-302(1985) which reads in 
pertinent part: 
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(1) (a) (i) No person who is or should be 
licensed under this title, no employee or 
agent of that licensee or person who should be 
licensed, no person whose primary interest is 
as a competitor of a person licensed under 
this title, and no person on behalf of any of 
these persons may make or cause to be made any 
communication which contains false or 
misleading information, relating to an 
insurance contract, any insurer, or other 
licensee under this title, including 
information which is false or misleading 
because it is incomplete. 
(b) If an insurance agent or third party 
administrator distributes cards or documents, 
exhibits a sign, or publishes an advertisement 
that violates Subsection d(l)(a), with 
reference to a particular insurer that the 
agent represents, or for whom the third party 
administrator processes claims and if the 
cards, documents, signs, or advertisements are 
supplied or approved by that insurer, the 
agent's or the third party administrator's 
violation creates a rebuttable presumption 
that the violation was also committed by the 
insurer. [Emphasis added.] 
Guardian intentionally issued a title policy with false, 
misleading and incomplete information to American by intentionally 
deleting any reference to the Scenic Rail trust deed when Guardian 
knew the trust deed existed, it was senior in priority to 
American's trust deed, and American had required all liens such as 
the Scenic Rail trust deed to be paid off before the loan proceeds 
were disbursed. A rebuttable presumption that U.S. Life also 
violated this statute arose under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-
302(1)(b), which presumption was never rebutted. 
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Finally, U.S. Life and Guardian breached the statutory duty 
within Utah Code Ann. § 31A-20-110(1). Guardian's argument that 
Paragraph 11 of the title policy limits all legal action to a 
contract action under the policy would also nullify this statutory 
duty and any remedy thereunder. 
E. GUARDIAN IS LIABLE FOR ITS OWN ACTION 
THAT BREACHED CONTRACTUAL AND TORT DUTIES OWED 
TO AMERICAN. 
Guardian argues that since it was merely an agent for USLife 
and since all duties owed by Guardian and USLife to American merged 
into the title policy, only USLife could be found liable for breach 
of the title policy. 
Guardian cites 3 Am.Jur. 2nd, Agency, § 302 and the 
Restatement of the Law, Agency 2nd, § 320, to support its 
proposition that Guardian, as an agent acting for a disclosed 
principal, cannot be liable for failing to follow the 
escrow/closing instructions and issuing a false title policy with 
the complete loss of American's trust deed caused by the 
intentionally deleted Scenic Rail trust deed. 
Fortunately, such is not the state of our common law. Section 
302 of 3 Am.Jur. 2nd, Agency, and Section 320 of the Restatement 
of the Law, Agency 2nd, limits liability for breach of contract by 
the principal where the agent acts "lawfully" (not in breach of any 
duties owed to third parties) and within the scope of his 
authority. This section does not limit liability where the agent 
commits a fraud or tort against a third party, or where the agent 
breaches a contract on his own behalf. In these latter cases, the 
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agent is liable for his actions. Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P2d 
696, 699 (Utah 1985); Mecham v. Benson , 590 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 
1979); 3 Am.Jur.2nd, Agency, § 309; and Restatement of the Law, 
Agency 2nd, § 343. 
Finally, Guardian admits to certain tort and contract duties 
owed to American in the following statement located at the bottom 
of page ten of its brief: 
An insurance agent does, however, have a duty 
to procure the insurance policy on the terms 
and conditions directed by the client, and if 
he fails to do so, he would become liable for 
damages suffered from lack of insurance. 
This duty is one of the duties fully explained within 3 Couch 
on Insurance Second, §§ 25:32 - 25:46, these duties being the duty 
to obey instructions (such as American's escrow instructions to 
Guardian), the duty to use reasonable skill and care (such as 
Guardian's duty to make sure American's trust deed was in a first 
position), and the duty not to mislead the insured (by 
intentionally issuing a false title policy). 
Guardian is simply responsible for its own acts that breached 
contractual or tort duties. The law does not allow Guardian to 
hide behind the claim that it was acting on behalf of a disclosed 
principal. 
POINT II 
THE PROVISIONS OF THE TITLE POLICY WERE 
BREACHED BY USLIFE AND GUARDIAN AND THEY ARE 
LIABLE TO AMERICAN UNDER BREACH OF CONTRACT 
THEORIES. 
At Point III of its Argument, Guardian proposes that its title 
policy is a contract of indemnity, not a contract of warranty or 
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guarantee. Guardian cites the Idaho case of Brown's Tie & Lumber 
v. Chicago Title Company, 764 P.2d 423, 429 (Idaho 1988) for this 
proposition. Based upon this premise, Guardian goes on to argue 
that as a contract of indemnity, the policy would be breached only 
if American incurred damage by virtue of its mortgage not being in 
first position and USLife refused to indemnify American for the 
damage. Guardian argues that USLife tendered the $29,957.30 which 
would have been necessary to pay off Scenic Rail at its foreclosure 
sale. Thus, Guardian concludes that according to Securities' 
Service, Inc. v. Transamerica Title Insurance Company, 583 P. 2d 
1217, 1223 (Wash. App. 1978), USLife fully performed all 
obligations owed to American under the title policy. 
A. THE TITLE POLICY WAS A CONTRACT OF 
WARRANTY WHICH WAS BREACHED BY USLIFE AND 
GUARDIAN. 
Guardian's argument is incorrect in several respects as to 
the law and as to the facts. First, the Brown's Tie case is Idaho 
law, not Utah law. The Utah Supreme Court in Bush v. Coult, 594 
P. 2d 865, 867 (Utah 1979) was faced with interpreting a lender's 
title policy insuring a trust deed of the Lockhart Company. 
Lockhart's trust deed had failed because the interest of its 
trustor was based upon a forged deed. The title insurer defended 
against Lockhart's claim by arguing that Lockhart failed to inform 
it that another title insurer had previously declined to insure 
Lockhart's trust deed because of questions concerning the integrity 
of a Mr. Jerome Yeck. Mr. Yeck was the principal in the 
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development company that sought to develop the property with 
Lockhart's borrower/trustor. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether Lockhart 
had a legal obligation to convey this information to the title 
insurer by quoting Empire Development Company v. Title Guarantee 
and Trust Company, 225 N.Y. 53, 121 N.E. 468 (1918) as follows: 
[t]o a layman a [title] search is a 
mystery, and the various pitfalls that may 
beset his title are dreaded, but unknown 
To avoid a possible claim against him to 
obviate the need and expense of professional 
advice, and the uncertainty that sometimes 
results even after it has been obtained, is 
the very purpose for which the owner seeks 
insurance. . . 
A title policy is much in the nature of a 
covenant of warranty or a covenant against 
encumbrances ." [ Emphasis added. ] l 
xThe importance of the distinction between a contract of 
indemnity and a contract of warranty is demonstrated in the case 
of Summonte v. First American Title Insurance Co., 180 N.J. Super. 
605, 436 A. 2d 110 (1981). In the Summonte case, the insurer was 
arguing that as a contract of indemnity, no damage was incurred by 
the insured until the default of the undisclosed encumbrance cause 
the insured to pay money to protect his property interest. The 
court reviewed a history of the cases where a title insurance 
policy was interpreted to be a contract of warranty. These cases 
included the Empire Development Company case adopted by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Bush. The New Jersey Superior Court agreed with 
the statement in Empire Development Company that "to say that when 
a defect subsequently develops he [the insured] has lost nothing 
and, therefore, can recover nothing, is to misinterpret the 
intention of both the insured and the insurer." Empire Development 
Company v. Title Guarantee and Trust Company, at p. 47 0. The New 
Jersey Court concluded that "any concept of fair dealing requires 
the [title] company to remove the title defect without insisting 
upon an "actual loss" as it defines that unworkable term" Summonte 
v. First American Title Insurance Co., at p. 116.; CF. Jarchow v. 
Transamerican Title Insurance Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 122 Cal. 
Rptr. 470 (D.Ct. App. 1975), wherein the California Court of appeal 
held "we hold that when a title company insures a buyer of real 
property against liens and negligently fails to discover or 
disclose a recorded lien or encumbrance or fails to exclude a known 
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The Utah Supreme Court has since upheld the Bush case and its 
interpretation of a title policy as a contract or covenant of 
warranty against encumbrances. In the recent case of Zion's First 
National Bank, N.A. vs. National American Title Insurance Company, 
749 P. 2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988), the Supreme Court again interpreted 
a lender's title policy as a contract of warranty and that the 
insured was under no obligation to perform the duty of the 
insurance company, i.e. determine the validity and state of the 
insured's title.2 
In the case of Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P. 2d 598, 604 (Utah 
1983), the Utah Supreme Court defined a contract of warranty as 
follows: 
A warranty is an assurance by on party to a 
contract of the existence of a fact upon which 
the other party may rely. It is intended to 
relieve the promisee of any duty to ascertain 
the fact for himself, and it amounts to a 
promise to answer in damages for any injury 
proximately caused if the fact warrantied 
proves untrue. 
recorded lien or encumbrance from coverage and, upon being notified 
of the existence of a recorded lien or encumbrance, unjustifiably 
refuses to take any legal action to clear the title or eliminate 
the cloud, the insurer may be liable to the insured..." 48 Cal. 
App. 3d at p. 926, 122 Cal. Rptr. at p. 476. 
2There is one case in Utah that has held a lender's title 
policy to be a contract of indemnity. Valley Bank & Trust Company 
v. USLife Title Insurance Company of Dallas, 776 P.2d 933, 935 
(Utah App. 1989) . This case is contrary to the Bush and Zion' s the 
title policy as a ocntract of indemnity in the Valley Bank case may 
have been unnecessary to resolve the issues of that case. This 
Court should reconsider its designation of a lender's title policy 
as a contract of indemnity and consider such an insurance policy 
as a contract of warranty consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's 
interpretation of such a contract. 
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Citations omitted. 
In Groen, the Supreme Court continued: 
Unlike liability for negligence, which is 
based on fault, breach of warranty sounds in 
strict liability. Breach of warranty does not 
require that the person making the 
representation or promise be aware that it is 
false . . . 
Citations omitted. 
As a contract of warranty, the USLife Title policy warrantied 
or assured American that American's trust deed was a "first and 
paramount lien of record" and that Guardian and USLife had paid 
"off any and all liens on the subject property" ahead of American's 
trust deed as expressly required in American's escrow/closing 
instructions. Yet, USLife and Guardian issued the policy with 
constructive and actual knowledge of the Scenic Rail trust deed 
and the fact that it was senior to American's trust deed. This 
action was an immediate breach of five of the eight warranties set 
forth within the first page of the title policy.3 
3POLICY OF TITLE INSURANCE issued by USLIFE Title Insurance 
Company of Dallas, SUBJECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE. THE 
EXCEPTIONS CONTAINED IN SCHEDULE B AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE 
CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS HEREOF, USLIFE Title Insurance Company 
of Dallas, a Texas corporation, herein called the Company, insures 
as of Date of Policy shown in Schedule A, against loss or damage 
not exceeding the amount of insurance stated in Schedule A, against 
loss or damage costs, attorneys fees and expenses which the compnay 
may become obligated to pay hereunder, sustained or incurred by the 
insured by reason of: 
1. Title to the estate or interest described in 
Schedule A being vested otherwise than as 
stated therein: 
2. Any defect in or lien or encumbrane on such 
title: 
. . . 
4. Unmarketability of such title: 
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American had the right to bring an action on the date of the 
breach of these warranties, i.e., the date the policy was issued, 
and American would have filed such an action if the true state of 
the title had not been concealed by Guardian and USLife. Indeed, 
such an action would have been consistent with the doctrine of 
"reasonable expectations", which provides that American had the 
right to expect the title for which it had purchased insurance.4 
B. THE TITLE POLICY WAS CONTRACTUALLY BREACHED EVEN IF 
THE POLICY IS INTERPRETED TO BE A CONTRACT OF INDEMNITY. 
USLife breached the promises made within paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 
5 and 6 of the first page of the policy set forth within footnote 
3, above. American's trust deed was lost by foreclosure of the 
Scenic Rail Trust Deed, a defect or encumbrance known to Guardian 
at the time the policy was issued. Since this trust deed was known 
to Guardian, USLife is considered to have also known of the Scenic 
Rail trust deed at the time the policy was issued. Hardy v. 
Prudential Insurance Company of America, 763 P.2d 761, 767 (Utah 
1988) . 
5. The invalidity or unenforceability of the lien of 
the insured mortgage upon siad estate or interest. . . 
6• The priority of any lien or curcumference over the 
lien of the insured mortgage; 
4USLife Title Ins. Co. of Dallas v. Hutsell, 296 S.E.2d 760 
(Ga. App. 1982); Dinqes v. Lawyers Title Ins. Co., 435 N.E.2d 944 
(111. App. 1982); Dixon v. Shirley, 558 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. 1977); 
Laabs v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 72 Wis.2d 503, 241 N.W.2d (1976); 
Jarchow v. Transamerican Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 1917, 122 
Cal. Rptr. 470 (1975); Pruett v. Mississippi Valley Title Insurance 
Co., 271 So.2d 920 (Miss 1973); Summonte v. First American Title 
Ins. Co., supra. at p. 112. 
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American's entire security interest which totalled $82,651.51 
as of the date the Strong's defaulted under their loan had failed. 
The collateral was the only likely source of payment on American's 
loan. The Strongs had filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy and received a 
discharge of their debts. No distribution was paid to unsecured 
creditors from their bankruptcy estate. 
Notwithstanding these facts, USLife refused to pay any money 
whatsoever towards American's claim. American was forced to file 
suit and prosecute this action for nearly one year before USLife 
tendered the $29,957.30 that Guardian now proudly asserts was full 
and complete performance under the title policy. However, this 
payment did not make American whole for the loss of its entire 
$82,000 security interest, which loss was caused by the Scenic Rail 
trust deed which was actually known to exist by Guardian and USLife 
and which was intentionally hidden from American. 
C. THE TENDER BY USLIFE OF $29,957.30 WAS NOT 
SUFFICIENT TO FULFILL THE CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATIONS OF USLIFE UNDER THE TITLE POLICY. 
As set forth above, Guardian cites the Securities' Service 
case for the proposition that " [ojrdinarily, when the defect 
insured against takes the form of a lien or encumbrance, the 
owner's loss is measured by the amount of money required to remove 
the offending lien or encumbrance." Citations omitted. However, 
Judge Moffat, the trial judge herein, cites the Securities' Service 
case to support his theory of breach "where at the time the policy 
was delivered, the title was defective by reason of a lien or 
encumbrance, the contract was breached and the company was 
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immediately liable to the insured for the loss actually suffered-" 
Minute Entry of Judge Richard H. Moffat, April 19, 1989, page two. 
(Included within the addendum to brief of Guardian.) 
The Securities' Service case actually stands for the 
proposition that ordinarily an owner's loss under an owner's title 
policy caused by a senior trust deed that was not an exception to 
the policy, is usually measured by the amount of money paid to the 
lienholder to remove the lien or encumbrance. However, where the 
actual loss to the owner is different from the amount that would 
have been required by the lienholder to clear off the offending 
lien, the actual loss is the amount of damage. In the Securities' 
Service case, this actual loss was, in fact, less than the amount 
of the lien since the total monies paid by the owner for the 
property was less than the amount due on the offending lien. 
However, in the case at bar, the amount of the actual loss was much 
more than the $29,957.30 due to Scenic Rail on the date it 
foreclosed out American's mortgage. American's entire security 
interest had failed because of the shenanigans of Guardian Title. 
The entire security interest was the actual loss of American and 
totalled over $82,000. 
POINT III 
THE UNDISPUTED FACTS SHOW A BREACH OF 
TORT AND IMPLIED CONTRACT DUTIES OWED TO 
AMERICAN BY GUARDIAN AND USLIFE. 
American sued Guardian and USLife and based its summary 
judgement upon breach of the warranties within the title policy, 
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breach of the duty to establish the title of American as insured, 
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, breach of the 
duty to correctly perform American's escrow/closing instructions, 
breach of the duty to correctly abstract the title, fraud, 
negligent misrepresentation, equitable estoppel, breach of public 
policy considerations because of the postclaim actions of the 
attorneys for the title companies, and violation of the unfair 
marketing practices statute (Utah Code Ann. §31A-23-302). 
Only the first three theories of liability are founded upon 
breach of contractual duties within the title policy. Yet, the 
undisputed facts support liability under any and all of the 
theories. Guardian does not address liability under the non-
contract theories, choosing to argue that American is limited to 
only the contract theories. As demonstrated above in Point I of 
the Argument, American is not so limited, and Guardian has not 
sought to appeal the propriety of any judgement based upon the 
non-contract theories, 
A. GUARDIAN AND U.S.LIFE BREACHED THEIR DUTY 
TO COMPLY WITH THE ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS OF 
AMERICAN. 
The escrow instructions were clear and unequivocal. They 
stated that the title policy to be issued by Guardian and U.S.Life 
was to insure the American trust deed as a "first and paramount 
lien of record" and that Guardian was to "pay off any and all liens 
on the subject property" ahead of American's trust deed. Guardian 
admittedly received these instructions and was operating under 
their clear direction. 
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As escrow/closing agents, Guardian and USLife were under a 
duty to strictly comply with the instructions. Banville v. 
Schmidt, 37 Cal, App.3d 92, 112 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1974); Amen v. 
Merced County Title Co., 25 Cal. Rptr. 65, 375 P.2d 33 (1962); 
Malta v. Phoenix Title & Trust Co., 76 Ariz. 116, 554 P. 2d 259 
(1953). Their failure to do so constituted breach of an implied 
contract with American. 
Guardian and USLife were also considered fiduciaries to 
American and owed American the duty to perform their instructed 
assignment with scrupulous honesty, skill and diligence. 
Buffington v. Title Ins. Co. of Minn., 26 Ariz. App. 97, 546 P.2d 
366 (1976); Ford v. Guarantee Abstract and Title, 220 Kan. 244, 533 
P. 2d 254 (1076); Amen, supra; and Moe v. Transamerican Title 
Insurance Company, 21 Cal. App.3d 289, 98 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1971). 
The failure of Guardian and U.S.Life to do so exposed Guardian and 
USLife to tort liability. 
Regardless of whether the duty owed by Guardian and USLife to 
American is characterized as contract or fiduciary, theire is no 
question that their actions breached either type of duty. Guardian 
and USLife knew of the Scenic Rail trust deed prior to closing 
American's loan,, After the closing, Guardian and USLife discovered 
that they had mistakenly paid the Strongs instead of Scenic Rail. 
American's trust deed was not a "first and paramount lien of 
record" and Guardian had not "paid off any and all liens on the 
subject property" ahead of American. Rather than inform American 
of the mistake, Guardian chose to issue the title policy without 
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any mention of the Scenic Rail trust deed. Guardian further 
concealed these facts from American for three years. 
USLife is responsible and liable for the actions of Guardian 
as an escrow/closing agent under Utah Code Ann. §31A-23-308 (1985). 
(This code section is contained within the addendum hereto.) 
Finally, Utah Code Ann. §31A-20-110 (1) imposed underwriting 
standards on Guardian and USLife, as follows: 
No title insurance policy may be written until the title 
insurer or its agent has conducted a reasonable search and 
examination of the title and has made a determination of 
insurability of title under sound underwriting principles. 
[Emphasis Added] 
The standard of a "reasonable search" was not met, but Guardian 
chose to issue the policy notwithstanding. 
B. GUARDIAN BREACHED ITS DUTY AS AN 
ABSTRACTOR OF TITLE. 
The Utah Supreme Court held in the Culp case that a title 
insurer generally does not accept the duty to properly abstract 
title by issuing title insurance. However, the court recognized 
that explicit escrow instructions to a title agent that loan 
proceeds not be disbursed until the state of the title is as 
instructed by the insured lender, will give rise to a cause of 
action for abstractor liability against the title agent. Culp 
Construction Company vs Buildmart Mall, at p.7. 
C. GUARDIAN AND U.S. LIFE ARE LIABLE FOR 
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION. 
Under the case of Christiansen v. Commonwealth Land Title 
Insurance Co. 666 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah 1983), a title insurance 
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agent performing escrow/closing functions was held to have 
committed the tort of negligent misrepresentation as to a third 
party relying upon a written statement of the real property that 
remained under an escrow agreement. The Utah Supreme Court held 
that the elements of a cause of action for the tort of negligent 
misrepresentation were: 
Where (1) one having a pecuniary interest in a transaction (2) 
is in a superior position to know material facts, and (3) 
carelessly or negligently makes a false representation 
concerning them (4) expecting the other party to rely and act 
thereon, and (5) and the other party reasonably does so and 
(6) suffers loss in that transaction, the representor can be 
held responsible if the other elements of fraud are also 
present. 
Christiansen v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co., at P. 305. 
Clearly Guardian and USLife had a pecuniary interest in the 
transaction for they were paid an insurance premium. Guardian was 
also in a superior position to know of the material fact of the 
Scenic Rail trust deed and in fact had actual knowledge of this 
trust deed and its priority over American's trust deed. Guardian 
carelessly and negligently made a false statement in light of the 
explicit escrow/closing instructions of American. American 
reasonably relied upon the omission of the Scenic Rail trust deed 
in the title policy. Finally, American suffered the loss of its 
entire security interest at the hands of the omitted Scenic Rail 
trust deed. 
USLife is responsible for the torts of its agent, Guardian, 
committed in the performance of Guardian's authorized duties. 
Buckner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989). 
D. GUARDIAN AND USLIFE COMMITTED A FRAUD UPON AMERICAN. 
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In Utah, fraud is the making of a false representation 
concerning a presently existing material fact which the representor 
either knew to be false or made recklessly without sufficient 
knowledge, or the omission of a material fact when there is a duty 
to disclose, for the purpose for inducing action on the part of the 
other party, with actual, justifiable reliance resulting in damage 
to that party. 5 
Guardian and USLife have admitted the above facts which 
establish a prima facie case for fraud and have generated no 
evidence that infers anything but an uncontested finding of fraud. 
E. GUARDIAN AND USLIFE ARE ESTOPPED FROM 
DENYING COVERAGE OF AMERICAN UNDER ITS TITLE 
POLICY. 
Guardian and USLife are estopped from denying coverage of 
American's trust deed. The elements of estoppel in Utah are one 
person by his words, deeds, conduct or omissions leads another 
person in good faith to rely upon such acts or omissions and the 
person so relying has been intentionally lead thereby to change his 
position and the person so relying would not have changed his 
position except for the conduct of the other party. If such facts 
exist, the person so acting or committing such omission shall be 
5Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assoc, Inc., 739 P. 2d 634 (Utah 
1987); Taylor v. Gasor, Inc., 607 P.2d 293 (Utah 1980); Pace v. 
Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273; Oberg v. Sanders, 111 Utah 
507, 184 P.2d 229. 
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precluded, both at law and in equity, from denying or asserting 
that the material fact or act does not exist.6 
Given the actions of Guardian and USLife, no clearer case of 
estoppel to deny liability under the title policy could possibly 
be presented to this Court. 
F. GUARDIAN AND U.S.LIFE HAVE WAIVED ANY AND 
ALL DEFENSES UNDER THE TITLE POLICY BECAUSE OF 
THE ACTIONS OF THEIR ATTORNEYS, AND AS A 
MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY THEY ARE STRICTLY 
LIABLE TO AMERICAN. 
On or about March 9, 1987, American discovered that its trust 
deed had been foreclosed by Scenic Rail. American immediately 
notified Guardian and USLife of this fact. Mr. M. Lynn Mabey, a 
Utah Attorney, called American's counsel, Mr. Lester A. Perry, and 
discussed this situation. Mr. Mabey represented that he felt that 
it would be prudent for him, as counsel for American, to file a 
state court action to set aside the Scenic Rail trustee's sale and 
to file an action in the Strong's bankruptcy to object to the 
discharge of American's debt. 
During the course of several conversations between March 9, 
1987 and March 18, 1987, Mr. Mabey and Mr. Perry fully discussed 
the facts that were then unfolding. They also considered strategy 
and legal theories of recovery. Mr. Perry held these discussions 
only because Mr. Mabey expressly represented that he was the title 
company's attorney hired to represent American. 
6Larson v Wycoff Co., 624 P. 2d 1151 (Utah 1981); Ravarino v 
Price, 260 P.2d 570 (Utah 1953); Mialiaccio v Davis, 232 P.2d 195 
(Utah 1951) . 
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Mr. Mabey confirmed his legal representation of American as 
its attorney by letter of March 13, 1987 to Ms. Leila Brand, and 
employee and officer of American. (This letter is included within 
the addendum hereto as Exhibit "G".) 
On April 17, 1987, Mr. John T. Anderson sent a letter to Ms. 
Brand indicating that he represented the title insurer and that Mr. 
Mabey was not authorized to represent American. (This letter is 
included within the addendum hereto as Exhibit "H".) This letter 
was sent one month after full and complete discussions between Mr. 
Mabey and Mr. Perry concerning the facts and legal strategies of 
American. Mr. Anderson, thereafter, required Mr. Mabey to dismiss 
the state court action and cease any and all representation of 
American in either the state court or bankruptcy actions. 
On July 6, 1987, Mr. Anderson sent a letter to Mr. Perry's law 
firm denying coverage of American under the policy. Mr. Anderson 
clearly based his denial upon the discussions between Mr. Mabey and 
Mr. Anderson. Mr. Anderson's letter stated that "Lester Perry 
frankly acknowledged to Guardian's counsel, L. Benson Maybe, that 
Mr. Perry was "concerned" and "alarmed" that his paralegal did not 
discover the foregoing facts,..." (A copy of this letter is 
contained within the addendum hereto as Exhibit "I".) 
American then filed the present law suit. Who should appear 
as counsel for the defendant's Guardian and USLife? Mr. Mabey and 
Mr. Anderson. 
Because of the actions of their attorneys, Guardian and USLife 
are fully and strictly liable to American for all damages, not 
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restricted by policy limits, and the defendants are estopped from 
asserting any defenses whatsoever under the policy. The courts 
have held title companies to this penalty as a matter of public 
policy to prevent this type of abuse by insurance companies. 
Lake Havasu Community Hospital v. Arizona Title Ins. and Trust Co., 
141 Ariz 363, 687 P.2d 371 (1984). 
G. GUARDIAN AND USLIFE VIOLATED THE UNFAIR 
MARKETING PRACTICES STATUTE OF UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 31A-23-302. 
Guardian and USLife owed a statutory duty to American to not 
commit an unfair insurance marketing practice as defined by Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-23-302 (1985), a copy of which is included within 
the addendum hereto as Exhibit "B". Guardian violated this code 
section by issuing the title insurance policy with false, 
misleading and incomplete information. USLife authorized Guardian 
to act as its agent to search title records and issue title 
insurance on its behalf. The rebuttable presumption of violation 
of this statute by the insurer has been raised, but no facts exist 
or have been presented to rebut the presumption. Thus, both 
Guardian and USLife are statutorily liable for all damages caused 
to American. 
H. GUARDIAN AND USLIFE BREACHED THEIR IMPLIED 
CONTRACTUAL DUTIES OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR 
DEALING OWED TO AMERICAN. 
USLife and Guardian owed American a duty to act in good faith 
and to deal fairly with American. Beck vs Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, at p. 801. TI* failure of Guardian and USLife to act 
fairly and in good faith exposed them to all foreseeable damages 
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for breach of contract. Such damages are not restricted to policy 
limits. Beck vs Farmers Insurance Exchanger at p.802. 
Guardian and USLife breached the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing by the following actions: 
1. Failing to follow the escrow/closing instructions of 
American and then intentionally hiding such failure from 
American by issuing a false title insurance policy and 
covering up their actions to cure their mistake; 
2. By denying coverage and requiring American to sue and 
prosecute this action for almost one year before tendering 
payment of $29,957.30 to American on March 17, 1988, which 
payment was admittedly owed by Guardian and USLife even under 
their version of the facts and law; 
3. By the actions of the attorneys for Guardian and USLife, 
where Guardian's counsel claimed to represent American, filed 
two legal actions on behalf of American, held strategy 
conferences with American's representative based upon his 
avowed representation of American, and then USLife denied 
coverage of American based upon the discussions and 
information obtained from the strategy conferences. 
Guardian and USLife have acted in bad faith from the outset 
Their appeal, without any brief being filed on behalf of USLife, 
is a culmination of this bad faith. 
POINT IV 
THE DAMAGES TO AMERICAN SHOULD BE 
MEASURED FROM THE DATE THE POLICY 
WAS ISSUED AND ARE EQUAL TO THE 
AMOUNT OF THE MONEY LOANED BY 
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AMERICAN, PLUS INTEREST LESS ANY 
PAYMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE. 
In Point IV of its argument, Guardian claims that the 
insurance policy did not insure that American would be paid7 on its 
loan or that the collateral would be worth enough to cover 
American's debt. Guardian does not dispute that the fair market 
value of the collateral was sufficient to cover Americans debt when 
the loan was made in March of 1984. Guardian, however, claims that 
the fair market value of the collateral decreased between 1984 ajid 
1987 when Americans trust deed was foreclosed by Scenic Rail. 
Guardian asserts that American's damages must be limited to the 
decreased value of the collateral and since this value was not 
established or is disputed, summary judgement should not have been 
granted to American on the issue of damages. Basically, the issue 
presented to this court by Guardian is whether damages be measured 
by the amount of the loan or be limited to the fair market value 
of the collateral and on what date should the collateral be valued, 
i.e. who should bear the risk of decrease in the fair market value 
of the collateral? 
A. AMERICAN WOULD NOT HAVE ALLOWED THE LOAN 
TO CLOSE AND ITS MONEY DISBURSED IF AMERICAN 
KNEW OF THE ACTIONS OF GUARDIAN AND USLIFE; 
THUS, DAMAGES SHOULD BE MEASURED BY THE DATE 
THE LOAN WAS CLOSED AND EQUAL THE AMOUNT DUE 
ON THE LOAN. 
7There is no dispute that American would not have been paid on 
its loan by any other source other than the subject collateral. The 
borrowers have taken out bankruptcy, received a discharge, and no 
bankruptcy dividend was paid to their unsecured creditors. 
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The cases cited by Guardian state that the normal measure of 
damages under a lender's title policy where a lender discovers an 
undisclosed defect or encumbrance ahead of its mortgage is the fair 
market value of the collateral without the undisclosed defect or 
encumbrance less the fair market value of the collateral with the 
undisclosed defect or encumbrance. Security Services Inc. v. 
Transamerican Title Insurance Co. , at p. 1221; Diversified Mortgage 
Investors v. USLife Title Insurance Co., 544 F.2d 571, 574, note 
2, (2d Cir. 1976) . 
However, these cases are based upon breach of contract and 
recovery was measured by the terms and limitations of the insurance 
policies. Under certain circumstances, the insured has the right 
to sue outside the contract and is not consigned solely to contract 
damages or the policy limits. Point I of Argument, above, and 
cases cited therein; Security Services Inc. v. Transamerican Title 
Insurance Corp., at p. 1221. Such circumstances that support 
damages outside the contract exist in the case at bar. 
As a result of the misrepresentation and other actions of 
Guardian and USLife, American's loan to the Strongs was closed and 
American's money disbursed. If American would have known that its 
trust deed was not in a first priority position as directed in its 
escrow/closing instructions, American would not have delivered the 
loan proceeds to Guardian for disbursal. There would not have been 
a loan, nor any subsequent loss of American's security interest to 
the Scenic Rail foreclosure. Thus, the measure of damages to 
American is what it parted with at the time of the loan, plus 
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interest, less any payments made towards the loan prior to entry 
of the summary judgement. This amount was undisputed and was the 
amount of the judgement awarded by Judge Moffat. 
This measure of damages is supported by the breach of 
warranty/breach of duty to establish title cases set forth within 
Point II of this Argument, above, and is further supported by 9 
Appleman's Insurance Law and Practice, para. 5210, p. 15, which is 
cited by Judge Moffat in his decision and reads as follows: 
Where at the time the policy was delivered the title 
was defective by reason of a lien or encumbrance, 
the contract was breached and the company was 
immediately liable to the insured for the actual 
loss suffered. 
Even under the title policy, this measure of damages was 
supported by the case of Citicorp Savings of Illinois v. Stewart 
Title Guarantee Co., 840 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1988) in Citicorp, 
Stewart Title issued a lender's title policy to Citicorp insuring 
a $27,000.00 loan. However, the borrower was not competent to sign 
the trust deed when it was executed since a conservator had been 
previously appointed over his estate. 
Thus, the trust deed was unenforceable and the court held that 
upon issuance of the policy there was an immediate breach of the 
warranty against "the invalidity or unenforceability of the lien 
of the insured mortgage...". The court went on to hold that 
Citicorp would not have extended the $27,000.00 loan to its 
borrower if it would have known that its trust deed would not have 
been enforceable. Thus, where the title insurer does not dispute 
that the fair market value of the collateral it insured was less 
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than the amount loaned at the time of the loan, the measure of 
damages would be the amount loaned, i.e. $27,000.00 in Citicorp's 
case. 
In addition to the warranty against the invalidity or 
unenforceability of the lien of American, USLife breached 3 to 4 
other warranties contained on the first page of the title policy. 
These breached warranties included the warranty that title to the 
estate was vested otherwise than stated, the warranty against any 
defect in or lien or encumbrance on such title, the warranty 
against priority of any other lien or encumbrance over the trust 
deed of American. Thus, these warranties were breached immediately 
upon issuance of the title policy and where Guardian does not 
dispute that the fair market value of the collateral exceeded the 
amount of the loan on the date of the loan, damages are measured 
by the amount of the money loaned. 
The Seventh Circuit Court went on to recognize in the Citicorp 
case that the real issue was under the circumstances who should 
bear the risk of a decline in the market value of the collateral. 
The court reasoned that since the loan would not have been made had 
the true state of the facts been revealed to Citicorp, "The policy 
was breached in 1979 (the date the loan was closed), and the loss 
became fixed at that time. Stewart Title should therefore bear any 
risk of market value decline in the property after that time." 
Citicorp Savings of Illinois v. Stewart Title Guarantee Co., at 
p.530. 
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Since Guardian and USLife chose to hide the truth of their 
actions, they should bear the decline in market value of American's 
collateral. American simply would not have closed the loan had it 
known the truth. If Guardian and USLife would have revealed the 
true state of facts and even after the money had been disbursed 
would have promptly moved to pay off the Scenic Rail trust deed, 
then American's security interest would not have been lost. By 
their own conscious choice, they chose to expose American to a 
possible total loss of its security interest to the undisclosed 
Scenic Rail trust deed. Under these undisputed facts and 
circumstances, Guardian and USLife should bear the responsibility 
for the entire loss of American's loan. 
POINT V 
AMERICAN OWED NO DUTY TO GUARDIAN AND USLIFE 
TO MITIGATE DAMAGES AND AMERICAN COULD NOT 
MITIGATE ITS DAMAGES. 
The undisputed facts show that in 1986 American was in 
possession of a foreclosure report from a nonparty, independent 
title company showing that even though the Scenic Rail trust deed 
was entitled "A Second Trust Deed", it was recorded prior to 
American's trust deed. This foreclosure report was obtained by 
American's counsel who was acting as its substituted trustee for 
purposes of foreclosing American's trust deed. The facts also show 
that in 1986 Scenic Rail sent American a Notice of Default and a 
Notice of Sale indicating that it was foreclosing its "Second Trust 
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Deed", but listing a recording date earlier than American's trust 
deed. 
Guardian argues that American owed it and USLife the duty to 
mitigate the damages caused by the actions of Guardian and USLife 
and that American failed to meet this duty by not giving USLife 
notice of the Scenic Rail foreclosure. American argues that when 
the Scenic Rail notices were received, the recording date of the 
Scenic Rail trust deed was not compared with the recording date of 
the American trust deed because American knew its trust deed was 
a first trust deed pursuant to its closing/escrow instructions and 
its U.S. title policy clearly showing American in first position 
with no mention of a Scenic Rail trust deed. Further, the Scenic 
Rail trust deed was entitled "A Second Trust Deed". 
Guardian argues that the reasonableness of American's belief 
that its trust deed was in first position is at a minimum a fact 
question that should be determined at trail precluding summary 
judgment. Guardian further argues that American's possession of 
the notices and the foreclosure report constitute a complete bar 
to recovery. 
A. GUARDIAN AND USLIFE SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED 
TO "LAY-IN-WAIT" FOR THREE YEARS FOR SOMETHING 
TO HAPPEN TO ABSOLVE THEM OF LIABILITY. 
Guardian asks, this court to grant judicial approval to a 
"lay-in-wait" strategy. Guardian and USLife failed to abide by the 
escrow/closing instructions of American. They knew that Guardian 
had made a mistake and failed to pay off the Scenic Rail trust 
deed. Notwithstanding this fact, they intentionally issued a false 
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title policy listing American's trust deed in first position and 
omitting any mention of the Scenic Rail trust deed. They hid this 
problem for three years while they attempted to obtain payment of 
the Scenic Rail trust deed from the Strong's or a subordination 
agreement from Scenic Rail. Finally, they took no effort to assure 
their receipt of notice of any Scenic Rail foreclosure by recording 
a Request for Notice pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §57-1-26(1). 
The doctrine of mitigation of damages or avoidable 
consequences was not designed to absolve Guardian and USLife from 
liability create by the total abdication of their responsibility 
owed to its insured, American. Judge Moffat so found at the trial 
court level and this Court should affirm. 
B. GUARDIAN AND USLIFE KNEW OF THE SCENIC 
RAIL TRUST DEED AND INTENTIONALLY HID ITS 
EXISTENCE FROM AMERICAN- THUS, GUARDIAN AND 
USLIFE WERE BETTER ABLE THAN AMERICAN TO 
MITIGATE ITS DAMAGES. 
Guardian sites the cases of DeBrv and Hilton Services Inc. v. 
Capital International Airways Inc., 583 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1978), Utah 
Farm Production Credit Association v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62 (Utah 1981), 
and Madsen v. Murrey & Sons Co. Inc., 743 P.2d 1212 (Utah 1987) for 
the proposition that an aggrieved party may not aggravate his 
damages but has a duty to actively mitigate his damages. However, 
Guardian does not cite the case of Angelos v. First Interstate Bank 
of Utah, 671 P.2d 772 (Utah 1983). 
In the Angelos case the Utah Supreme Court refused to apply 
the avoidable consequences doctrine to that case for two reasons. 
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First, the avoidable consequences doctrine does not preclude an 
aggrieved party from recovering for damages sustained by future 
actions of the defendant. Second, and bearing upon the case at 
bar, the doctrine of avoidable consequences does not prevent an 
aggrieved party from recovering where the party causing the damage 
is in as good of, if not a better, position to avoid the 
consequences of his action or mitigate the damages caused to the 
aggrieved party. Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah/ at p. 
777. 
In the present case, Guardian and USLife were hired by 
American as professionals with particular expertise in the area of 
title searches and title insurance. American relied upon them to 
adequately search the title and properly close the loan pursuant 
to its instructions and issue a correct title policy. Guardian and 
USLife had constructive and actual knowledge of the Scenic Rail 
trust deed prior to issuing the false title policy. They were fully 
aware of the consequences of their actions and also aware that 
American's trust deed could be foreclosed out by Scenic Rail. 
Guardian and USLife were in a superior position to mitigate 
any possible damages to American. They should have cured the 
problem that they created by immediately paying off Scenic Rail. 
They should not have hid the problem for over three years and then 
point the finger at American, especially when they intentionally 
hid the Scenic Rail trust deed from American. At the very least, 
Guardian and USLife should have recorded a Request for Notice that 
would have assured their notice of any Scenic Rail foreclosure. 
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C. AMERICAN OWED NO DUTY TO GUARDIAN AND 
USLIFE TO REVEAL THE SCENIC RAIL TRUST DEED OR 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF FORECLOSURE OF SAID TRUST 
DEED. 
Guardian and USLife were professionals. The law imposed no 
duty on American to tell Guardian and USLife about the Scenic Rail 
trust deed or the consequences of its foreclosure. Guardian and 
USLife knew about the trust deed and hid that knowledge from 
American. 
Where a title insurer knows or should have known about a title 
defect, it can not abdicate its responsibility to its insured by 
claiming the insured had the duty to inform the insurer of a title 
defect or encumbrance. Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National American 
Title Insurance, at p. 651; Bush v. Coulty at p. 867; Moe v. 
Transamerican Title Insurance Co., at Cal. Rptr. pp 554-557. 
(1971); Smirlock v. Title Guarantee Co., at N.Y.S.2d p. 61. 
Nautilus Inc. v. Transamerican Title Insurance Co. of Washington, 
15 Wash. App. 345, 534 P.2d 1388 (1975). 
Guardian and USLife assumed the risk of the Scenic Rail trust 
deed. Their own actions caused the complete loss of American's 
security interest, not American's failure to realize that a senior 
trust deed was foreclosing out its trust deed. Guardian and USLife 
intentionally hid the existence of the senior trust deed from 
American. Given these circumstances, American's actions or 
knowledge is irrelevant to the liability of Guardian and USLife. 
D. AMERICAN'S DAMAGES WERE SET ON THE DATE 
GUARDIAN AND USLIFE IMPROPERLY CLOSED THE LOAN 
AND ISSUED A FALSE AND FRAUDULENT TITLE 
POLICY. 
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As demonstrated in the preceeding points of argument herein, 
the breach of contract, breach of tort duties, fraud, estoppel, 
etc., occurred upon improperly closing the loan and issuing the 
false title policy. As further argued the damages were set as of 
that date. These damages were not limited to contract damages, 
constrained by policy limits. Since the damages had already 
accrued, they could not be mitigated at a point three years down 
the road. 
POINT VI 
THERE WERE NO MATERIAL ISSUES OF 
FACT WHICH PRECLUDED SUMMARY 
JUDGEMENT. 
At Point VI of its Argument, Guardian argues that the 
following questions of fact existed which precluded summary 
judgement: 
1. What, if any, of the actions of defendants are not 
included within the duties express or implied in the 
indemnity contract of title insurance? 
2. At exactly what point in time did plaintiff incur 
damages for which it is entitle to indemnity and compensation? 
3. What was the market value of the security at the time 
when the damages arose? 
4. What was the difference of the value of plaintiff's 
security at the time damage arose and the value of that 
security had plaintiff been in a first priority position? 
5. At what point was plaintiff aware that its priority was 
subordinate to a prior encumbrance? 
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6. Did plaintiff fail to take prompt, appropriate action to 
protect its interest in the security, thereby mitigating its 
damages? 
7. To what extend did plaintiff's failure to mitigate affect 
the amount of damages? 
The first issue, i.e. interpretation of the duties owed under 
the title policy is a question of law and the actions of Guardian 
and USLife that breached the contract are clearly without dispute. 
The second issue, the time when the damages arose is a 
question of interpretation of the contract as determined by case 
law. This date was either the date the policy was issued, the 
date of the Scenic Rail foreclosure sale, or the date of the claim 
of American. No facts exist that need to be resolved before this 
court can determine which date is appropriate. 
Where, as in the case at bar, the market value of the 
collateral exceeded the amount of the loan on the date of the 
loan, any decrease in the market value is irrelevant because it is 
to be born by the insurer. 
The issue of notice to American of the Scenic Rail 
foreclosure is likewise irrelevant. There is no duty of an 
insured to notify a title insurer of a recorded defect or 
encumbrance. There is especially no duty to notify the title 
insurer where it had actual knowledge of the defect or encumbrance 
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and the existence of the defect or encumbrance was intentionally 
hid from the insured. 
Judge Moffat considered only undisputed facts in the most 
advantageous light for Guardian and USLife when he awarded summary 
judgement. 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN NOT 
AWARDING REASONABLE ATTORNEYS FEES 
THAT WERE NECESSARILY INCURRED BY 
AMERICAN. 
Judge Moffat ruled that as a matter of law there was not a 
sufficient showing of a bad faith defense to justify an award of 
attorneys fee on behalf of American. 
A. UNDER BECK v. FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, THE 
COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED AN AWARD OF REASONABLE 
ATTORNEYS FEES THAT WERE NECESSARILY INCURRED BY 
AMERICAN. 
In Zions First National Bank v. National American Title 
Insurance, the Utah Supreme Court was faced with the District Court 
award of attorneys fees to an insured who was forced to sue its 
title insurance company for failing to provide coverage. The 
District Court had awarded attorneys fees and court costs to the 
insured pursuant to a provision identical to paragraph 6(b) of the 
USLife policy. Justice Zimmerman held that the award of fees and 
costs was not supportable by this policy provision. However, 
Justice Zimmerman went on to add: 
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Although it does not affect the outome of this 
appeal, it is worth noting that since Espinoza was 
decided, and after the decision below was rendered, 
we announced the existence of an implied contractual 
obligation to perform a first party insurance 
contract fairly and in good faith. See Beck v. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 800-01 
(Utah 1985). Damages for breach of this implied 
covenant can include consequential damages. Id. at 
801. Attorney's fees incurred by an insured in suing 
its insurer because of such a breach would be 
recoverable conseguential damages because they 
plainly are reasonably foreseeable by the parties 
at the time the contract is made. See Id. Although 
Zions did not proceed against National American on 
this theory, it would arguably be available to 
others similarly situated, despite the language in 
the standard form contract, because the implied 
covenant announced in Beck cannot be contractually 
waived. Id. at 801, Note 4. [Emphasis Added] 
In Point III H. of this Argument, American fully sets forth 
the actions of Guardian and USLife that constitute breach of the 
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. The record is replete 
with undisputed facts concerning bad faith and total disregard of 
American's rights. Judge Moffat should not have denied attorneys 
fees as a matter of law. 
B. ATTORNEYS FEES SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED TO 
AMERICAN BASED UPON THE FRAUD COMMITTED BY 
GUARDIAN AND USLIFE. 
An award of attorneys fees is appropriate where a fraud has 
been committed. In Moe v. Transamerica Title Insurance Co./ the 
California Court of Appeal was faced with a very similar situation 
as in the case at bar. Moe has been discussed above and its 
factual discussion will not be repeated. The court held that where 
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a title agent, and its underwriter through respondeat superior, 
intentionally concealed a bankruptcy proceeding in a title policy, 
and it became necessary for the insured to sue the title agent and 
underwriter, an award of attorneys fees was "unquestionably 
proper". 
C. ATTORNEYS FEES SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED TO 
AMERICAN PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. §78-27-
56. 
Judge Moffat errored in not granting attorneys fees based on 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56. In order to gain an award of attorneys 
fees under this section, two elements must be met. First, the 
losing party's claim or defense must be "without merit", which as 
determined in Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P. 2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983), means 
bordering on frivolity. Second, the losing party's conduct must 
have been in good faith. 
The actions of Guardian and USLife must met both elements. 
First, American had given Guardian clear closing instruction which 
were not followed, and Guardian issued a false and misleading title 
policy, to cover up its mistake. Second, Guardian and USLife 
intentionally kept American in the dark to avoid an immediate claim 
on the title policy. Third, Guardian and USLife failed to take 
preliminary precautions to assure that they received notice of any 
Scenic Rail foreclosure by recording a Request for Notice. 
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Fourth, when American filed a claim, the attorney's for 
Guardian and USLife embarked on actions founded in conflict of 
interest. 
Fifth, Guardian has asserted from the commencement of this 
law suit that all that it owed to American was the amount necessary 
to pay off Scenic Rail on the date of its foreclosure. Rather than 
pay this amount, which was substantial and totalled $29,957,30, 
Guardian and USLife forced American to file this law suit and 
prosecute it for almost one year before any payment was made. This 
court should remand this action to Judge Moffat to determine an 
appropriate amount of attorneys fees incurred before and after this 
appeal. 
POINT VIII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN NOT 
FINDING GUARDIAN AND USLIFE LIABLE 
FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES, BUT RESERVING 
THE EVIDENTIARY ISSUE OF THEIR 
FINANCIAL CONDITION FOR A SUBSEQUENT 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING. 
The trial court errored in denying American's request to find 
Guardian and USLife liable for punitive damages, reserving the 
issue of their financial condition for a subsequent evidentiary 
hearing. In Utah, a party is liable for punitive damages if 
compensatory damages are awarded and it is established by clear 
and convincing evidence that the party breached a tort duty 
through willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, 
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or conduct that manifested a knowing and reckless indifference 
toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others. Utah Code Ann. 
78-18-1(1)(a) (1989); Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988). 
The actions of Guardian and USLife have been fully set forth 
above. They need not be repeated. However, they clearly set 
forth, by undisputed facts, conduct that was knowing and in 
reckless disregard of the rights of American. 
Further, USLife is liable for punitive damages as a 
"managerial agent" of Guardian, as such term is defined within the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency §217C and the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, §909, as adopted in Utah within Johnson v. Rogers, at 
p. 776. 
The Contract of Agency between Guardian and USLife, a copy 
of which is included within the addendum hereto as Exhibit "J", 
provided that Guardian had the authority on behalf of USLife to 
issue title insurance commitments, examine the title of property 
upon which such commitments would be based, to correctly reflect 
the condition on the title on such commitments and title policies, 
to collect premiums on behalf of USLife and keep 80% of the 
premiums, and to properly and regularly close transactions upon 
which the commitment or policy was predicated. Based upon such a 
contract, Guardian clearly had a broad scope of authority, was 
acting within the scope of authority with respect to all actions 
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taken on behalf of or against American, and clearly met the test 
of a "managerial agent" or an agent employed in a "managerial 
capacity". 
This court should hold that Guardian and USLife are clearly 
responsible for punitive damages to American and remand this 
action to the trial court for a determination of their financial 
condition and an appropriate amount of punitive damages. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the descision of the trial court as 
to complensatory damages and reserse the descision as to the 
denial of attorney's fees and punitive damages remanding to the 
trial court the determination of the amount of fees and amount of 
punitive damages. 
Respectfully submitted this / J — day of-J**£y, 1990 
Lester A. Perry 
Attorney for New West Federal Savings 
& Loan Association, as Receiver for 
American Savings. 
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ance, may not exceed 50% of the capital and surplus 
of the insurer. 1985 
31A-20-110. Underwriting rules for title insur-
ance. 
(1) No title insurance policy may be written until 
the title insurer or its agent has conducted a reason-
able search and examination of the title and has 
made a determination of insurability of title under 
sound underwriting principles. Evidence of this 
search and reasonable determination shall be re-
tained in the files of the title insurer or its agent for 
not less than 15 years after the policy has been is-
sued, either in its original form or as recorded by any 
process which can accurately and reliably reproduce 
the original. This section does not apply to a company 
assuming liability through a contract of reinsurance, 
or to a company acting as comsurer, if another coin-
suring company has complied with this section. 
(2) No title insurance policy may be issued except 
by a title insurance company or by an agent licensed 
under Section 31A-23-203. 
(3) This section is enforceable only by the commis-
sioner. It does not create, eliminate, or modify any 
private cause of action or remedy. 1985 
CHAPTER 21 
INSURANCE CONTRACTS IN GENERAL 
Part I 
General Rules 
Section 
31A-2M01. Scope of Chapters 21 and 22, Title 
31A. 
31A-21-102. Oral contracts of insurance and 
binders. 
31A-2M03. Capacity to contract. 
31A-21-104. Insurance interest and consent. 
31A-21-105. Representations, warranties, and con-
ditions. 
31A-21-106. Incorporation by reference. 
31A-21-107. Contract rights under noncomplying 
policies. 
31A-21-108. Subrogation actions. 
Part n 
Approval of Forms 
31A-21-201. Filing and approval of forms. 
31A-21-202. Explicit approval required. 
31A-21-203. Authorized clauses for insurance 
forms. 
Part III 
Specific Clauses in Contracts 
31A-21-301. Clauses required to be in a prominent 
position. 
31A-21-302. Premiums. 
31A-21-303. Termination of insurance policies by 
insurers. 
31A-21-304. Special cancellation provisions. 
31A-21-305. Cancellation upon request of a pre-
mium finance company. 
31A-21-306. Policies or surety bonds jointly issued. 
Section 
31A-21-311. Group and blanket insurance. 
31A-21-312. Notice and proof of loss. 
31A-21-313. Limitation of actions. 
31A-21-314. Prohibited provisions. 
Part IV 
Mass Marketed Life or Disability Insu rance 
31A-21-401. Scope and construction of part. 
31A-21-402. Definitions. 
31A-21-403. Orders terminating effectiveness of 
policies. 
31A-21-404. Out-of-state insurers. 
PART I 
GENERAL RULES 
31A-21-101. Scope of Chapters 21 and 22, Title 
31A. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections (2) through 
(6), this chapter and Chapter 22 apply to all insur-
ance policies, applications, and certificates: 
(a) delivered or issued for delivery in this 
state; 
(b) on property ordinarily located in this state; 
(c) on persons residing in this state when the 
policy is issued; and 
(d) on business operations in this state. 
(2) This chapter and Chapter 22 do not apply to: 
(a) the exemptions provided in Section 
31A-1-103; 
(b) insurance policies procured under Sections 
31A-15-103 and 31A-15-104; 
(c) an insurance policy on business operations 
in this state if the contract is negotiated primar-
ily outside this state and if the operations in this 
state are incidental or subordinate to operations 
outside this state, except that insurance required 
by a Utah statute must conform to the statutory 
requirements; or 
(d) other exemptions provided in this title. 
(3) Sections 31A-21-102, 31A-21-103, 31A-21-104, 
Subsections 31A-21-107(1) and (3), and Sections 
31A-21-306, 31A-21-308, 31A-21-312, and 31A-21-
314 apply to ocean marine and inland marine insur-
ance. Section 31A-21-201 applies to inland marine 
insurance that is written according to manual rules 
or rating plans. 
(4) Group or blanket policies are subject to this 
chapter and Chapter 22, except: 
(a) group or blanket policies outside the scope 
of this title under Subsection 31A-1-103 (3) (h); 
and 
(b) other exemptions provided under Subsec-
tion (5). 
(5) The commissioner may by rule exempt any 
class of insurance contract or class of insurer from 
any or all of the provisions of this chapter and Chap-
ter 22 if the interests of the Utah insureds, creditors, 
or the public would not be harmed by the exemption. 
(6) Workers' compensation insurance, including 
that written by the Workers' Compensation Fund of 
Utah, is subject to this chapter and Chapter 22. 
(7) Unless clearly inapplicable, any provision of 
this chapter or Chapter 22 applicable to either a pol-
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(2) No licensee under this chapter may act as to the 
same client as both an agent and broker without the 
client's prior written consent based on full disclosure 
(3) Whenever a person applies for insurance cover-
age through a broker, the broker shall disclose to the 
applicant, in writing, that the broker is not the agent 
of the potential insurer This disclosure shall also in-
form the applicant that the applicant likely does not 
have the benefit of an insurer being financially re-
sponsible for the broker's conduct 1989 
31A-23-302. Unfair marketing practices. 
(1) (a) d) No person who is or should be licensed 
under this title, no employee or agent of that 
licensee or person who should be licensed, no 
person whose primary interest is as a com-
petitor of a person licensed under this title, 
and no person on behalf of any of these per-
sons may make or cause to be made any com-
munication which contains false or mislead-
ing information, relating to an insurance 
contract, any insurer, or other licensee under 
this title, including information which is 
false or misleading because it is incomplete 
(11) As used in this subsection, "false or 
misleading information" includes, but is not 
limited to 
(A) assuring the nonobhgatory pay-
ment of future dividends or refunds of 
unused premiums in any specific or ap-
proximate amounts, but reporting fully 
and accurately past experience is not 
false or misleading information, and 
(B) with intent to deceive a person ex-
amining it, filing a report, making a 
false entry in a record, or wilfully re-
fraining from making a proper entry in 
a record 
(in) No insurer or other licensee under 
this title may use any business name, slo-
gan, emblem, or related device that is mis-
leading or likely to cause the insurer or 
other licensee to be mistaken for another in-
surer or other licensee already in business 
(IV) No person who is not an insurer may 
assume or use any name that deceptively im-
plies or suggests that it is an insurer 
(v) No person other than persons licensed 
as health maintenance organizations under 
Chapter 8 may use the term "Health Mainte-
nance Organization" or "HMO" m referring 
to i t se l f j j 
(b) If an insurance agent or third5 party admin-
istrator distributes cards or documents, exhibits 
a sign, or publishes an advertisement that vio-
lates Subsection (l)(a), with reference to a partic-
ular insurer that the agent represents, or for 
whom the third party administrator processes 
claims, and if the cards, documents, signs, or ad-
vertisements are supplied or approved by that 
insurer, the agent's or the third party adminis-
trator's violation creates a rebuttable presump-
tion that the violation was also committed by the 
insurer 
(2) (a) No insurer, no licensee under this chapter, 
and no officer or employee of either may induce 
any person to enter into an insurance contract or 
to terminate an existing insurance contract by 
offering benefits not specified in the policy to be 
issued, including premium or commission re-
bates, nor may any insurer make or knowingly 
allow any agreement of insurance that is not 
clearly expressed in the policy to be issued This 
subsection does not preclude insurers from reduc-
ing premiums because of expense savings, nor 
does this subsection preclude the usual kinds of 
social courtesies not related to particular trans-
actions This subsection does not bar an insurer 
from receiving premiums under an installment 
payment plan 
(b) No agent, broker, or insurer may absorb 
the tax under Subsection 31A-3-301 
(c) (l) No title insurer or agent or any officer or 
employee of either may pay, allow, give, or 
offer to pay, allow, or give, directly or indi-
rectly, as an inducement to obtaining any 
title insurance business, any rebate, reduc-
tion, or abatement of any rate or charge 
made incident to the issuance of the insur-
ance, any special favor or advantage not gen-
erally available to others, or any money or 
other consideration or material inducement 
(u) "Charge made incident to the issuance 
of the insurance" includes escrow, settle-
ment, and closing charges, and any other 
services which are prescribed by the commis-
sioner 
(m) No insured or any other person con-
nected directly or indirectly with the trans-
action, including a mortgage lender, real es-
tate broker, builder, attorney, or any officer, 
employee, or agent of any of them, may 
knowmgly receive or accept, directly or indi-
rectly, any benefit referred to in Subsection 
(2)(c)(i) 
(3) No insurer may unfairly discriminate among 
policyholders by charging different premiums or by 
offering different terms of coverage, except on the ba-
sis of classifications related to the nature and the 
degree of the nsk covered or the expenses involved. 
Rates are not unfairly discriminatory if they are av-
eraged broadly among persons insured under a group, 
blanket, or franchise policy, and the terms of those 
policies are not unfairly discriminatory merely be-
cause they are more favorable than in similar indi-
vidual policies 
(4) No person who is or should be licensed under 
this title, no employee or agent of that licensee or 
person who should be licensed, no person whose pri-
mary interest is as a competitor of a person licensed 
under this title, and no one acting on behalf of any of 
these persons, may commit or enter into any agree-
ment to participate in any act of boycott, coercion, or 
intimidation which tends to produce an unreasonable 
restraint of the business of insurance or a monopoly 
in that business 
(5) No person may restrict in the choice of an in-
surer or insurance agent or broker, another person 
who is required to pay for insurance as a condition for 
the conclusion of a contract or other transaction or for 
the exercise of any right under a contract The person 
requiring the coverage may, however, reserve the 
right to disapprove the insurer or the coverage se-
lected on reasonable grounds The form of corporate 
organization of an insurer authorized to do business 
in this state is not a reasonable ground for disap-
proval, and the commissioner may by rule specify ad-
ditional grounds that are not reasonable This subsec-
tion does not bar an insurer from declining an appli-
cation for insurance 
(6) No person may make any charge other than 
insurance premiums and premium financing charges 
for the protection of property or of a security interest 
in property, as a condition for obtaining, renewing, or 
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continuing the financing of a purchase of the property 
or the lending of money on the security of an interest 
in the property 
(7) No agent may refuse or fail to return promptly 
all indicia of agency to the principal on demand No 
licensee whose license is suspended, limited, or re-
voked under Section 31A-2-308, 31A-23-216, or 
31A-23-217 may refuse or fail to return the license to 
the commissioner on demand 
(8) No person may engage in any other unfair 
method of competition or any other unfair or decep-
tive act oi practice in the business of insurance, as 
defined by the commissioner, by rule, after a finding 
that they are misleading, deceptive, unfairly discrim-
inatory, provide an unfair inducement, or unreason-
ably restrain competition 1987 
31A-23-303. Inherent unsuitability. 
In the event the commissioner finds after a hearing 
that a certain type of disability insurance, life insur-
ance, or annuity product is inherently unsuitable for 
persons of certain ages or in certain conditions of 
health, the commissioner shall promulgate a rule de-
claring this disability insurance, life insurance, or 
annuity product as inherently unsuitable for persons 
of certain ages or m certain conditions of health No 
disability insurance, life insurance, or annuity prod-
uct that is subject to the rule may be sold to a person 
for whom the product has been determined as inher-
ently unsuitable unless that person purchasing the 
product signs a receipt acknowledging having re-
ceived a statement which expresses that the product 
has been determined by the commissioner to be in-
herently unsuitable for persons of certain ages or in 
certain conditions of health Unless the insurer or its 
agent establishes that its sale of coverage which is 
inconsistent with the rule is due to excusable neglect, 
the purchaser may treat the sale as voidable, if acted 
upon by the insured within a two-year period from 
the date oi sale 1986 
31A-23-304. Extension of credit on premiums. 
The extension of credit upon a premium by an 
agent or broker to the insured, without interest for 
not exceeding 90 days from the effective date of the 
policy, or after that time with interest on the unpaid 
balance at not less than the legal rate under Section 
15-1-1, is not a violation of Subsection 31A-23-302(2) 
The installment or payroll deduction payment of pre-
miums on policies issued under an insurer's mass 
marketing program is not an extension of credit 
1985 
31A-23-305. Insurer liability. 
(1) There is a rebuttable presumption that every 
insurer is bound by any act of its agent performed m 
this state that is within the scope of the agent's ac-
tual (express or implied) or apparent authonty, until 
the insurer has cancelled the agent's appointment 
and has made reasonable efforts to recover from the 
agent its policy forms and other indicia of agency 
Reasonable efforts include a formal demand in writ-
ing for return of the indicia, and notice to the com-
missioner if the agent does not promptly comply with 
the demand This subsection neither waives any com-
mon law defense available to insurers, nor precludes 
the insured from seeking redress against the agent 
individually or jointly against the insurer and agent 
(2) When a property/liability insurance agent with 
authority to bind more than one insurer on a particu-
lar risk agrees to bind coverage on a particular risk, 
but fails to outwardly indicate the insurer with which 
the risk is placed, and before the risk is placed with a 
particular insurer a loss occurs, if there is no conclu-
sive admissible evidence indicating the insurer with 
which the agent exercised his binding authority, a 
court may equitably apportion the loss among all in-
surers with which the agent had binding authority as 
to the particular type of risk 1986 
31A-23-306. Countersignature requirement. 
Whenever the laws of any other state require that a 
fixed fee or commission be paid its resident agents to 
countersign an insurance policy, all insurance compa-
nies of that state doing business within Utah shall 
pay a fee or commission to Utah resident agents on 
the same terms and conditions as provided by the 
laws of the other state 1985 
31A-23-307. Title insurance agents' business. 
A title insurance agent may engage m the escrow, 
settlement, or closing business, or any combination of 
such businesses, and operate as escrow, settlement, or 
closing agent provided that all the following exist 
(1) The title insurance agent is properly li-
censed under this chapter 
(2) (a) All funds deposited with the agent m 
connection with any escrow, settlement, or 
closing are deposited in a federally insured 
financial institution in separate trust ac-
counts, with the funds being the property of 
the persons entitled to them under the provi-
sions of the escrow, settlement, or closing 
The funds shall be segregated escrow by es-
crow, settlement by settlement, or closing by 
closing in the records of the agent These 
funds are not subject to any debts of the 
agent and may only be used to fulfill the 
terms of the individual escrow, settlement, 
or closing under which the funds were ac-
cepted None of the funds may be used until 
all conditions of the escrow, settlement, or 
closmg have been met 
(b) Any interest received on funds depos-
ited with the agent m connection with any 
escrow, settlement, or closing shall be paid 
over to the depositing party to the escrow, 
settlement, or closing and may not be trans-
ferred to the account of the agent 
(c) No check may be drawn, executed, or 
dated unless the segregated escrow account 
against which it is drawn contains a suffi-
cient credit balance consisting of collected or 
cleared funds, at the tune the check is 
drawn, executed, or dated 
(3) The ,^ title insurance agent shall maintain 
records of all receipts and disbursements of es-
crow, settlement, and closing funds 
(4) The title insurance agent shall comply 
with any rules adopted by the commissioner gov-
erning escrows, settlements, or closings. 1989 
31A-23-308. Liability of title insurers for acts of 
title insurance agents. 
Any title company, represented by one or more title 
insurance agents, is directly and primarily liable to 
others dealing with the title insurance agents for the 
receipt and disbursement of funds deposited in es-
crows, closings, or settlements with the title insur-
ance agents m all those transactions where a commit-
ment or binder for or policy or contract of title insur-
ance of that title insurance company has been or-
dered, or a preliminary report of the title insurance 
company has been issued or distributed This liability 
does not modify, mitigate, impair, or affect the con-
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t ractual obligations between the title insurance 
agents and the tit le insurance company 1985 
31A-23-309. Representations of agency. 
No person may represent himself as the agent of an 
insurer unless a written agency contract is in effect 
giving the person authority from the insurer 1985 
31A-23-310. Trust obligation for funds col-
lected. 
(1) Every agent or broker is a trustee for all funds 
received or collected as an agent or broker for for-
warding to insurers or to insureds Except for 
amounts necessary to pay bank charges, and except 
for funds paid by insureds and belonging in part to 
the agent or broker as fees or commissions, no agent 
or broker may commingle t rus t funds with his own 
funds or with funds held m any other capacity Ex-
cept as provided under Subsection (4), every agent or 
broker owes to insureds and insurers the fiduciary 
duties of a t rustee with respect to money to be for-
warded to insurers or insureds through the agent or 
broker Unless the funds are sent to the appropnate 
payee by the close of the next business day after their 
receipt, the licensee shall deposit them in an account 
authorized under Subsection (2) Funds so deposited 
shall remain in an account authorized under Subsec-
tion (2) unt i l sent to the appropnate payee 
(2) Funds required to be deposited under Subsec-
tion (1) shall be deposited 
(a) in a federally insured t rus t account with a 
financial insti tution located in this state, or 
(b) in some other account, approved by the 
commissioner by rule or order, providing safety 
comparable to federally insured t rus t accounts 
(3) It is not a violation of Subsection (2)(a) if the 
amounts in the accounts exceed the amount of the 
federal insurance on the accounts 
(4) A t rus t account into which funds are deposited 
may be interest b e a n n g Except as provided under 
Subsection 31A-23-307(2)(b), the interest accrued on 
the account may be paid to the agent or broker, so 
long as the agent or broker otherwise complies with 
this section and with the contract with the insurer 
(5) No financial insti tution or other organization 
holding t rus t funds under this section may offset or 
impound t rus t account funds against debts and obli-
gations incurred by the agent or broker 
(6) Any licensee who, not being lawfully entitled 
thereto, diverts or appropnates any portion of the 
funds held under Subsection (1) to his own use, is 
guilty of theft under Part 4 of Chapter 6, Title 76 
Section 76-6-412 applies in determining the classifi-
cation of the offense Sanctions under Section 
31A-2-308 also apply 1986 
31A-23-311. Insurer's liability if insured pays 
premium to agent, broker, or group 
policyholder. 
(1) Subject to Subsections (2) and (5), if an insurer, 
including a surplus lines insurer, has assumed a nsk 
and if the premium for that insurance has been re-
ceived by an agent or broker who placed the insur-
ance or by a group policyholder, including an em-
ployer who deducts part or all of the premium from 
the employees' wages or salary, then as between the 
insurer and the insured, the insurer is considered to 
have received the premium and is liable to the in-
sured for losses covered by the insurance and for any 
unearned premiums upon cancellation of the insur-
ance 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the insured 
pays an agent or broker, knowing the agent or broker 
does not intend to submit the premium to the insurer 
(3) In the case of an employer who has received the 
premium by deducting all or part of it from the wages 
or salaries of the certificate holders, the insurer may 
terminate its liability by giving certificate holders 
reasonable notice of coverage termination The liabil-
ity of the insurer terminates at the later of 
(a) the last day of the coverage penod for 
which premium has been withheld by the em-
ployer, or 
(b) 15 days after the date the insurer mails 
actual notice to the certificate holder tha t cover-
age has terminated, but in the event the insurer 
fails to provide actual notice as required by this 
subsection, then the insurance shall terminate 
45 days from the last date for which- premium 
was received 
(4) Despite an employer's collection of premium 
under Subsection (1), the responsibility of an insurer 
to continue to provide insurance to group policy cer-
tificate holders terminates upon the effective date of 
notice from the policyholder tha t 
(a) coverage of a similar kind and quality has 
been obtained from another insurer, or 
(b) the policyholder is electing to voluntarily 
terminate the certificate holder's coverage and 
has given the employees notice of the termina-
tion. 
(5) If the insurer or a certificate holder has a valid 
claim against an employer under Subsection (1) for 
failure to forward the premium, the claim may in-
clude reasonable expenses of suit and reasonable at-
torney's fees 
(6) If, under an employee health insurance plan, an 
employee builds up credit for future coverage because 
he has not used the policy protection, or in some other 
way, the insurer is obligated to the employee for tha t 
future coverage earned while the policy was in full 
effect 1989 
31A-23-312. Place of business and res idence ad-
dress — Records. 
(1) Every licensee under this chapter shall register 
with the commissioner the address of his pnncipal 
place of business and, if the hcensee is an individual, 
his residence address where the licensee may be read-
ily contacted m person, by mail, and by telephone 
The licensee shall notify the commissioner promptly 
of any change in the address or telephone number of 
his pnncipal place of business or residence 
(2) Except as provided under Subsection (3), every 
licensee under this chapter shall keep a t the principal 
place of business address registered under Subsection 
(1), a record of all transactions consummated under 
the Utah license The record shall be in an organized 
form and shall mclude all the following 
(a) if the licensee is an agent or broker 
d) a record of each insurance contract pro-
cured by or issued through the licensee, with 
the names of insurers and insureds, the 
amount of premium and commissions or 
other compensation, and the subject of the 
insurance, 
(n) the names of any other agents or bro-
kers from whom business is accepted, and of 
persons to whom commissions or allowances 
of any kind are promised or paid, 
(b) if the hcensee is a consultant, a record of 
each agreement outlining the work performed 
and the fee for the work, 
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(5) "Ski area operator" means those persons, 
and their agents, officers, employees or represen-
tatives, who operate a ski a rea 1979 
78-27-53- Inherent r i sks of sk i ing — Bar against 
claim or recovery from operator for in-
jury from risks inherent in sport. 
Notwithstanding anyth ing in Sections 78-27-37 
through 78-27-43 to the contrary, no skier may make 
any claim against , or recover from, any ski area oper-
ator for injury resul t ing from any of the inherent 
risks of skiing 1986 
78-27-54. Inherent r i s k s of s k i i n g — Tra i l 
boards listing inherent risks and limi-
tations on liability. 
Ski area operators shall post trail boards at one or 
more prominent locations within each ski area which 
shall include a list of the inherent risks of skiing, and 
the limitations on liability of ski area operators, as 
defined m this act 1979 
78-27-55. Repea led . 1980 
78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action 
or defense in bad faith — Exceptions. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reason-
able attorney's fees to a prevail ing par ty if the court 
determines tha t the action or defense to the action 
was without meri t and not brought or asserted in 
good faith, except under Subsection (2) 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees 
or limited fees against a par ty under Subsection (1), 
but only if the court 
(a) finds the par ty has filed an affidavit of 
impecuniosity in the action before the court, or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for 
not awarding fees under the provisions of Subsec-
tion (1) 1988 
78-27-56.5. Attorney's fees — Reciprocal rights 
to recover attorney's fees. 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to ei-
ther party tha t prevails in a civil action based upon 
any promissory note, wri t ten contract, or other writ-
ing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provi-
sions of the promissory note, wri t ten contract, or 
other writing allow at least one party to recover at-
torney's fees 1986 
78-27-57. Attorney's fees awarded to state 
funded agency in action against state 
or subdivis ion — Forfeit of appropri-
ated monies . 
Any agency or organization receiving state funds 
which, as a result of its suing the state, or political 
•abdmsion thereof, receives attorney's fees and costs 
•s all or part of a sett lement or award, shall forfeit to 
« e General Fund, from its appropriated monies, an 
•mount equal to the attorney's fees received. 1981 
I* 
78-27-58. Service of judicial process by persons 
fe* ' other than law enforcement officers. 
L***ersons who are not peace officers, constables, 
•henffs, or lawfully appointed deputies of such offi-
cers or authonzed s ta te investigators in counties of 
*j0,000 persons or more are not enti t led to serve any 
Sp&s of civil or criminal process other than com-
* " ats, summonses, and subpoenas 1983 
;27-59. Immunity for transient shelters . 
J) As used in this section, " t rans ient shelter" 
any person which provides shelter, food, cloth-
ing, or other products or services without consider-
ation to indigent persons 
(2) Except as provided m Subsection (3), all t ran-
sient shelters, owners, operators, and employees of 
t rans ient shelters, and persons who contribute prod-
ucts or services to t ransient shelters, are immune 
from suit for damages or injuries ans ing out of or 
related to the damaged or injured person's use of the 
products or services provided by the t ransient shelter 
(3) This section does not prohibit an action against 
a person for damages or injury intentionally caused 
by that person or resulting from his gross negligence 
C H A P T E R 27a 
SMALL B U S I N E S S EQUAL ACCESS TO 
J U S T I C E ACT 
Section 
78-27a-l Short title 
78-27a-2 Legislative findings — Purpose 
78-27a-3 Definitions 
78-27a-4 Litigation expense award authorized m 
actions by state 
78-27a-5 Litigation expense award authorized in 
appeals from administrative decisions 
78-27a-6 Payment of expenses awarded — State-
ment required in agency's budget 
78-27a-l. Short title. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the 
"Small Business Equal Access to Justice Act." 1983 
78-27a-2. Legis lat ive f indings — Purpose . 
The Legislature finds t ha t small businesses may be 
deterred from seeking review of or defending against 
substantially unjustified governmental action be-
cause of the expense involved in securing the vindica-
tion of their r ights The purpose of this act is to enti-
tle small businesses, under conditions set forth m this 
act, to recover reasonable litigation expenses. 1983 
78-27a-3. Def in i t ions . 
As used in this act 
(1) "Prevail" means to obtain favorable final 
judgment, the r ight to all appeals having been 
exhausted, on the merits , on substantially all 
counts or charges in the action and with respect 
to the most significant issue or set of issues pre-
sented, but does not include the sett lement of any 
action, either by stipulation, consent decree or 
otherwise, whether or not sett lement occurs be-
fore or after any hear ing or tr ial . 
(2) "Reasonable litigation expenses" means 
court costs, administrat ive h e a n n g costs, attor-
ney's fees, and witness fees of all necessary wit-
nesses, not m excess of $10,000, which a court 
finds were reasonably incurred in opposing ac-
tion covered under this act. 
(3) "Small business" means a commercial or 
business entity, including a sole proprietorship, 
which does not have more than 250 employees, 
but does not include an entity which is a subsid-
iary or affiliate of another enti ty which is not a 
small business 
(4) "State" means any department , board, in-
stitution, hospital, college, or university of the 
state of Utah or any political subdivision thereof, 
except with respect to an t i t rus t actions brought 
under Par t 9 of Chapter 10 of Title 76. 1983 
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as of course to the prevailing party unless the 
court otherwise directs, provided, however, 
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is 
taken, costs of the action, other than costs in con-
nection with such appeal or other proceeding for 
review shall abide the final determination of the 
cause Costs against the state of Utah, its officers 
and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent 
permitted by law 
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his 
costs must within five days after the entry of 
judgment serve upon the adverse party against 
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memoran-
dum of the items of his costs and necessary dis-
bursements in the action, and file with the court 
a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating 
that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, 
and that the disbursements have been necessar-
ily incurred in the action or proceeding A party 
dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within 
seven days after service of the memorandum of 
costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed 
by the court in which the judgment was ren-
dered 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after 
the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the 
service and filing of the findings of fact and con-
clusions of law but before the entry of judgment, 
shall nevertheless be considered as served and 
filed on the date judgment is entered 
(3), (4) [Deleted ] 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the 
judgment. The clerk must include in any judgment 
signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision 
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the 
same have been taxed or ascertained The clerk must, 
within two days after the costs have been taxed or 
ascertained, in any case where not included in the 
judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in 
the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar 
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the 
judgment docket 
(Amended effective January 1, 1985) 
Rule 55. Default. 
(a) Default. 
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judg-
ment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to 
plead or otherwise defend as provided by these 
rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk 
shall enter his default 
(2) Notice to party in default After the 
entry of the default of any party, as provided in 
Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be nec-
essary to give such party in default any notice of 
action taken or to be taken or to serve any notice 
or paper otherwise required by these rules to be 
served on a party to the action or proceeding, 
except as provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or 
in the event that it is necessary for the court to 
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of 
damages of the nondefaultmg party 
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be en-
tered as follows 
(1) By the clerk. When the plaintiffs claim 
against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a 
sum which can by computation be made certain, 
and the defendant has been personally served 
otherwise than by publication or by personal ser-
vice outside of this state, the clerk upon request 
of the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the 
amount due and costs against the defendant, if 
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he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if 
he is not an infant or incompetent person 
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party 
entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to 
the court therefor If, in order to enable the court 
to enter judgment or to carry it into effect it is 
necessary to take an account or to determine the 
amount of damages or to establish the truth of 
any averment by evidence or to make an investi-
gation of any other matter, the court may con-
duct such hearings or order such references as it 
deems necessary and proper 
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown 
the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a 
judgment by default has been entered, may likewise 
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b) 
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claim-
ants. The provisions of this rule apply whether the 
party entitled to the judgment by default is a plain-
tiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded 
a cross-claim or counterclaim In all cases a judgment 
by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c) 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or 
agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be en-
tered against the state of Utah or against an officer or 
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his 
claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the 
court 
(Amended, effective Sept 4, 1985 ) 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon 
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a 
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expi-
ration of 20 days from the commencement of the ac-
tion or after service of a motion for summary judg-
ment by the adverse party, move with or without sup-
porting affidavits for a summary judgment m his fa-
vor upon all or any part thereof 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a 
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a 
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a sum-
mary judgment in his favor as to all or any part 
thereof 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The mo-
tion shall be served at least 10 days before the time 
fixed for the hearing The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine 
issue as to the amount of damages 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on 
motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon 
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a tnal is 
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by 
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it 
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable as-
certain what matenal facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually and 
in good faith controverted It shall thereupon make 
an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which 
the amount of damages or other relief is not m contro-
versy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just Upon the trial of the action the 
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facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the 
tr\2A shall be conducted accordingly 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; de-
fense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and 
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein Sworn or cer-
tified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to 
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith The court may permit affidavits to be sup-
plemented or opposed by depositions, answers to in-
terrogatories, or further affidavits When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as pro-
vided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but 
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against him 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it 
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the 
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the 
court may refuse the application for judgment or may 
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be ob-
tained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be 
had or may make such other order as is just 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it ap-
pear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that 
any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of 
delay, the court shall forthwith order the party em-
ploying them to pay to the other party the amount of 
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affida-
vits caused him to incur, including reasonable attor-
ney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may 
be adjudged guilty of contempt 
Rule 57. Declaratory judgments. 
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judg-
ment pursuant to Chapter 33 of Title 78, U C A 1953, 
shall be in accordance with these rules, and the right 
to trial by jury may be demanded under the circum-
stances and in the manner provided in Rules 38 and 
39. The existence of another adequate remedy does 
not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases 
where it is appropriate. The court may order a speedy 
hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment and 
may advance it on the calendar. 
Rule 58A. Entry. 
(a) Judgment upon the verdict of a jury. Unless 
the court otherwise directs and subject to the provi-
sions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the verdict of a 
jury shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed 
If there is a special verdict or a general verdict ac-
companied by answers to interrogatories returned by 
a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the 
appropriate judgment which shall be forthwith 
signed by the clerk and filed 
(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided 
m Subdivision (a) hereof and Subdivision (b)(1) of 
Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed by the judge 
and filed with the clerk 
(c) When judgment entered; notation in regis-
ter of actions and judgment docket. A judgment is 
complete and shall be deemed entered for all pur-
poses, except the creation of a hen on real property, 
when the same is signed and filed as herein above 
provided. The clerk shall immediately make a nota-
tion of the judgment in the register of actions and the 
^udgmftirt, dackfct 
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment. The 
prevailing party shall promptly give notice of the 
signing or entry of judgment to all other parties and 
shall file proof of service of such notice with the clerk 
of the court However, the time for filing a notice of 
appeal is not affected by the notice requirement of 
this provision 
(e) Judgment after death of a party. If a party 
dies after a verdict or decision upon any issue of fact 
and before judgment, judgment may nevertheless be 
rendered thereon 
(0 Judgment by confession. Whenever a judg-
ment by confession is authonzed by statute, the party 
seeking the same must file with the clerk of the court 
in which the judgment is to be entered a statement, 
verified by the defendant, to the following effect 
(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money 
due or to become due, it shall concisely state the 
claim and that the sum confessed therefor is 
justly due or to become due, 
(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the 
purpose of securing the plaintiff against a contin-
gent liability, it must state concisely the claim 
and that the sum confessed therefor does not ex-
ceed the same; 
(3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for 
a specified sum. 
The clerk shall thereupon endorse upon the state-
ment, and enter in the judgment docket, a judgment 
of the court for the amount confessed, with costs of 
entry, if any 
(Amended, effective Sept. 4, 1985 and Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Rule 58B. Satisfaction of judgment. 
(a) Satisfaction by owner or attorney. A judg-
ment may be satisfied, m whole or m part, as to any 
or all of the judgment debtors, by the owner thereof, 
or by the attorney of record of the judgment creditor 
where no assignment of the judgment has been filed 
and such attorney executes such satisfaction within 
eight years after the entry of the judgment, in the 
following manner (1) by written instrument, duly ac-
knowledged by such owner or attorney; or (2) by ac-
knowledgment of such satisfaction signed by the 
owner or attorney and entered on the docket of the 
judgment m the county where first docketed, with the 
date affixed and witnessed by the clerk. Every satis-
faction of a part of the judgment, or as to one or more 
of the judgment debtors, shall state the amount paid 
thereon or for the release of such debtors, naming 
them. 
(b) Satisfaction by order of court. When a judg-
ment shall have been fully paid and not satisfied of 
record, or when the satisfaction of judgment shall 
have been lost, the court in which such judgment was 
recovered may, upon motion and satisfactory proof, 
authorize the attorney of the judgment creditor to 
satisfy the same, or may enter an order declaring the 
same satisfied and direct satisfaction to be entered 
upon the docket 
(c) Entry by clerk. Upon receipt of a satisfaction 
of judgment, duly executed and acknowledged, the 
clerk shall file the same with the papers in the case, 
and enter it on the register of actions He shall also 
enter a bnef statement of the substance thereof, in-
cluding the amount paid, on the margin of the judg-
ment docket, with the date of filing of such satisfac-
tion. 
(d) Effect of satisfaction. When a judgment shall 
have been satisfied, in whole or in part, or as to any 
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Le ila Brand 
Senior Liquidation Counselor 
American Savings & Loan Association 
540 East Main Street 
Stockton, California 95202 
RE: Letter Respecting Claim Under U.S. Life Title 
Policy No. M084729 
Dear M s . Brand: 
I represent Guardian Title Company with respect to your 
notice of claim under date of March 9, 1987 in connection with 
the referenced policy-
Please be advised that I have been engaged in discussions 
with Mr* Lester Perry at Kirton, McConkie <5c Bushnell regarding 
this matter. Based on my discussion with Mr. Perry, I have filed 
a petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah, 
Central Division, seeking to reopen the bankruptcy case of the 
borrowers, Lynn Strong and Cherie Strong. I have also commenced 
a civil action on behalf of Guardian and American Savings (with 
the permission of Mr. Perry in this regard) seeking' to set aside 
the trustee's sale conducted by Scenic Rail Credit Union 
(formerly known as Brotherhood of Railway Clerk's Credit Union) 
which was held on February 23, 1987. In connection with the 
civil action in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, I have recorded a Lis Pendens against the subject 
property to give notice of the pendency of the action. 
Please be advised that the actions that I have taken on 
behalf of American Savings are being done under a reservation of 
rights respecting defenses that may exist under the policy, 
particularly but without limitation, the defenses respecting 
A m e r i c a n ^ obligation to give prompt notice of the claim and to 
preserve and protect U.S Life's and Guardian's rights to cure and 
remedy defects in title. 
Leila Brand 
American Savings 
March 13, 1987 
Page 2 
be i n** f 
behalf 
i nqui r i 
through 
I will be forwarding a copy of the pleadings that are 
iled to Lester Perry who I am advised is counsel on your 
respecting this matter. If you should have further 
e s , it m a y be appropriate for such inquiries to be made 
Mr, Perry. 
Very truly yours, 
y 
s' 
LBM/j s 
cc 
L, Benson Mabey 
Murphy, Tolboe & Mabey 
a-vP 
Lester Perry 
G u a r d i a n Title 
Hansen & Anderson 
Attorneys at Law 
V*il«y Tower 8uildlng 
SO West flrotdway. Sixth floor 
Stit Uke City. Utih M101 
Telaphone (601) 532-7520 
Telecopier (501) 364-7*97 
April 17, 1987 
Ms, Leila Brand 
AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION 
540 East Main Street 
Stockton, California 95202 
Claim Against U.S. Life Title Insurance Company of Dallas 
Insurance Policy M-084729 
CL 161-87 
Dear Ms. Brand: 
We represent Title USA Insurance Corporation ("Company") in connection 
with a claim by American Savings & Loan Association ("American") against titte 
insurance policy no. M-084729 ("Policy"). The Company acknowledges receipt of 
American's claim dated March 9, 1987. 
At the Company's request, we are in the process of evaluating the facts and 
circumstances underlying the claim. We expect to complete that evaluation 
within the next ten days and will advise you of it at that time. 
In the meantime, we are advised that Guardian's legal counsel, L. Benson 
Mabey, has Instituted (i) a motion to reopen a bankruptcy case filed by the original 
owners of the subject property, M# Lynn Strong and Cheri G. Strong, and (ii) a 
complaint in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, Civil 
No. C-87-6829 (the "State Court Action"), on behalf of both Guardian and 
American, His purported justification for acting on American's behalf is under a 
"reservation of rights" theory under the Policy. The Company has advised Mr. 
Mabey that he Is not authorized to act on behalf of American on a reservation of 
rights basis or any other basis. Accordinglyr to the extent Mr. Mabey has created 
the- Impression'that he is authorized to act ombehalf ot the Company, please be 
assured that he is not. 
Finally, to assist us in our evaluation of the claim, we would appreciate 
receiving from American the following information: 
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Wlfi J Am P. Schwartz 
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C U * O.WWkfcln. 
Bruce Wvcoff 
^ 
Hansen & Anderson 
Ms. Leila Brand 
April 17, 1987 
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a. An Itemization of what efforts, if any, American undertook 
to advise the Company of the then pending foreclosure proceeding instituted by 
Scenic Rail Credit Union; 
b. If no such notice was provided, an Indication of the reason(s) 
for that fact; and, 
c. An indication as to whether or not American appeared at the 
trusteed sale and, if it did, an Indication of the action, If any, that it took at such 
sale. 
We look forward to hearing from you in the very near future. 
Very truly yours, 
JoKh T. Anderson 
JTA:clm 
cc Mr. John C. Mulvihill 
Jack Silver, Esq. 
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Hansen & Anderson 
Attorneys at Law 
John T Anderson 
Robert M.Anderson 
Ross C.Anderson 
Scott R. Carpenter 
Robert C Delahunty 
Steven W. Dougherty 
Shawn C. Femn 
Stuart A. Fredman 
J.Gordon Hansen 
Cary D.Jones 
Thomas R. Karrenberg 
David tLeta 
Russell H. Lowe 
John B.Maycock 
Blake a Miller 
William P. Schwartz 
Jamie J. Swenson 
Glen D.Watkins 
Bruce Wycoff 
July 6, 1987 
David M. Wahlquist, Esq. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE <5c BUSHNELL 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Valley Tower Building 
50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone (801) 532-7520 
Telecopier (801) 364-7697 
RECEIVED 
JUL 71367 
330So^3vJH;.r ~ 
SaJt Lake City, ui 64 n i 
Claim Against USLife Title Insurance Company of Dallas 
(Title USA) Policy No, M-084729 
CL: 161-87 
Dear David: 
Thank you for your letter of June 18, 1987 articulating the position of your 
client, American Savings <5c Loan Association ("American"), in the above matter. 
While I appreciate and agree with your statement that Guardian Title 
Company of Utah ("Guardian") should have provided timely notice to my client, 
Title USA (the "Company"), of Guardian's omission of the Scenic Rail Credit 
Union's trust deed lien as an exception to the subject policy of title insurance, I 
am hard pressed to understand American's contention that that failure was the 
proximate cause of loss under the policy. 
Indeed, there are a number of factors militating in favor of a finding that it 
was American, and not Title USA or Guardian, that had the last clear chance to 
avoid loss under the policy: (i) the Strongs' bankruptcy schedules, of which 
American had at least constructive knowledge, reflect that the Credit Union lien 
was superior and paramount to American's trust deed lien, (ii) prudent preparation 
of American's motion for relief from the automatic stay imposed by the Strongs' 
bankruptcy filing should have led to the discovery of the priority of the Credit 
Union's trust deed lien, (iii) on the two occasions that your office ordered 
foreclosure reports on the Strongs' property — August, 1986, in connection with 
the preparation of the original initial notice of default, and November, 1986, in 
connection with the preparation of the second notice of default — no one 
discerned the obvious and easily recognizable fact that the Credit Union lien had 
priority over American's trust deed lien, (iv) Lester Perry frankly acknowledged to 
Guardian's counsel, L. Benson Mabey, that Mr. Perry was "concerned" and 
"alarmed11 that his paralegal did not discover the foregoing fact, (v) the extensive 
period of time available to American to discern and assess the junior position of 
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its trust deed lien and apprise the Company of that fact, and, (vi) the established 
commercial standards and guidelines imposing on counsel the obligation to review 
promptly any foreclosure report to ascertain the existence of any title defects in 
an expeditious manner calculated to prevent unnecessary losses. 
In other words, the Company is still mystified by American's failure to 
provide notice to the Company and/or Guardian at any time between August, 1986 
and February, 1987, of the existence of the Credit Union trust deed lien. 
Obviously, if the apparent title defect represented by that lien had been disclosed 
to the Company, appropriate arrangements could have been made to satisfy the 
principal amount of the underlying obligation — approximately $27,131.00. 
Instead, because of American's failure to give notice to the Company of either the 
pendency of the foreclosure proceedings or the impending sales date, property 
having a fair market value of approximately $75,000.00 was sold for a discount of 
some $50,000.00. The Company would be interested in knowing why American 
apparently never considered bidding in at the foreclosure sale to protect its 
interest in the property and preserve the resulting equity for the benefit of all 
parties. 
In light of the foregoing, the Company is prepared to pay to American only 
the principal sum of $27,131.00 plus such interest as may be negotiated. The 
Company will not, however, honor any claim in excess of that amount. 
Finally, the Company will, of course, direct all further correspondence and 
contacts regarding this matter through your office. 
Very truly yours, 
Jonfc T. Anderson 
JTAtclm 
cc John C. Mulvihill, Esq. 
EXHIBIT " 
Contract cf Agency 
THIS COtiTRACT by *nd between USLIFE TITLE JNSURANCL COMPANY OF 
DALLAS, a Corporation duly organized and e x i s t i n g under the laws of the 
S t a t e of Texas, with i t s domic i le and pr inc ipal place of business in Dal las . 
Da l la s County, Texas, h e r e i n a f t e r referred to as the "COMPANY," and. Guardian 
T i t l e Company of Utah, a corporation, duly organized and e x i s t i n g under the 
laws of the State of Utah with i t s domicile and pr inc ipal place of business 
in the City of Sal t Lake City . County of Salt Lake , 
S t a t e of Tjtah , hereinafter referred to as "AGENT"; 
WITNESSETH THE FOLJjOWr'C. that for and in consideration of th* 
b e n e f i t : czzru^ny t« c«»cn, the pax t i e* tie*eto covenant and agree as fo l lows: 
SECTION T For a period t o commence on the 1st d a v o f Mar en , 
1** 73 , and t o continue u n t i l terminated as Hereinafter pxevaded, the 
COMPANY hereby appoints the AGEWT i t s agent v.itii authority * o i s s u e interim 
t i t l e insurance ^owptitments (hereinafter referred t o as Commitment or 
Commitments) ^and p o l i c e * * , * i £ ^ t i t l e insurance (hereinafter referred to as 
P o l i c y or P o l i c i e s ) of the COMPANY both on forms furnished the AGENT by 
the COMPANY, sucn ac t s t o be done only with reference to real e s t a t e located 
in the t e r r i t o r y of the AGCJT. which t e r r i t o r y i s f u l l y s e t out and shown 
immediately fo l lowing S e c t i o n I , hereof, provided that nothing herein 
contained s h a l l author ize the AGENT to i s sue a Commitment or Po l i cy in an 
amount in excess of S 300 ,000 .00 unless express ly authorized by the 
COMPANY t o do s o . The c o s t o f any coinsurance or reinsurance involved 
s h a l l be deducted and pa id t o COMPANY before computing the underwriting 
r i s k premium due the COMPANY as hereinafter provided. The AGENT accepts 
such appointment. 
TERRITORY OF AGENT 
S a l t Lake County 
The above d e f i n i t i o n of the AGENT'S t e r r i t o r y sha l l not preclude 
the AGE'«T fron s o l i c i t i n g t i t l e insurance business and i s su ing Commitments 
and/or P o l i c i e s of the CO'IPANY in other counties of the State of y^rqj 
except m those count ies where the COMPANY 15 represented by another agent . 
SECTION II Commitrcntn and P o l i c i e s so issued by the AGENT s h a l l be 
based on the examination o f t i t l e by an examiner approved by the COMPA"/ 
(here ina f t er referred t o as "APPROVED EXAMINERS"). Al l Commitments i s sued 
must be signed by an APPROVED EXAMINER and a copy of sa id Commitment for -
warded to the CO:*PA*JY along with a co«iy of the Tolicy o^ P o l i c i e s subse-
quent ly issued in connection with said Commitment. In the event that a 
P o l i c y i s issued when there has been no previous Commitment i s sued , a 
s i gned , wr i t ten Etaniner'e report must accompany the COMPANY'S remittance 
copy o f the P o l i c y . A Commitment or fxanmer ' s report w i l l not be requir*»a 
on a subsequent issuance in a subdivi«ion where a Commitment or Lxamm^r's 
report on the base t i t l e t o the subdivision has been previously furnished 
t o the C0:iPAJY; provided however, the AGE'JT must c e r t i f y to the COMPANY in 
w r i t i n g as to *uch subsequent issuance that no instrument a f f ec t ing t i t l e 
to s a i d property has been f i l e d for record s i n c e the date of the base 
Commitment or Examiner's r e p o r t . Where <\ifh Coinmitr -nt or Examiner'*; r i n i f 
i s based in an abs t j j»£ t j - j^p«re j by_$nmeone other than the-AGENT™ the AGE :T 
-w i l l «*>»uj*c f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the correctness and completeness of such 
an a b s t r a c t . The COMPANY s h e l l have the r ight to withdraw at any time i t s 
aoproval of an TxaroJncr t h e r e t o f o r e by i t approved. Any contract with said 
APPROVED EXAMINER a»hall be between the AGENT and the sa id txaminer. 
SECTION III The AGrKT agrees t o maintain h i s records and f l i c s so that such 
records and f i l e s «hal l at a l l time* during the l i f e of th i s contract be 
a v a i l a b l e for inspec t ion and examination by the COMPANY, and a f t e r termination 
of this contract be likewise available for the purposes of auditing financial 
accounts or in connection with the settlement of any claim or l o s s . 
such Commitments and Policies ate written and issued under and an accordance 
with this contract and all general and special laws applicable thereto and 
that sucH Commitments and Policies correctly reflect the condition of title 
as determined by the examination of such title by an APPROVED OAHINtR, os 
hereinbefore specified. 
All Commitments and Policies issued under this contract shall oe 
signed by the President or Vice President of the COMPANY and shall be 
countersigned by an officer or employee of tho AGENT approved by the COMPANY. 
SECTION IV iThe^ACTOT agree* to be responsible for the collection of all 
px*ni\m on all Commitments and Policies written by it under this contract. 
As between the AGENT and the COMPANY, such premiums r.hall be deemed to have 
been received by the AGD1T at the timo of the delivery of the Policies. 
The premium to be paid the COMPANY for its Commitments and Policies shall 
be as specified by the COMPANY and unless and until changed by the CO^PHI^Y 
upon notice to the AGK\"T shall be in accordance with the rates set forth in 
the "Schedule of P****-" attached to and ;uaJe part ijereof. 
SECTION V The *^CNT agrees to render a report to COMPANY not later than 
the 10th c*y of eaci calendar morth reflecting all policies lMUfc (or f i* 
none were issued) during the preceding calendar month, and the underwriterg 
risk premiums due COMPANY thereon, together with its check in full payment 
for the said underwriting risk premium, to which shall be added, in appro-
priate cases, the cost of coinsurance or reinsurance as provided in Section I, 
an accounting copy of each such Commitment or Policy as issued, a copy of the 
APPROVED EXAMINER'S report if no Commitment was issued, and a copy of any 
survey made, together with any other special data as may be specifically re-
quested by the COMPANY. Ihe amount-remitted to COMPANY .as the underwriting 
-vcisk premium on each policy shall -be 20. % of the rate computed in 
--accordance with the "Schedule of Rates'* attached hereto. 
SECTION VI. Trie AGENT shall_ be liable to the COMPANY for any loss or 
expense wtiich the COMPANY may sustain, whether before or after the termi-
nation of this contract, by reason of the issuance of any Commitment or 
Policy: {A} in violation of or contrary to this contract; (B) where the 
AGENT has omitted any abstract sheets or improperly abstracted any instru-
ment which is the oroximate cause of th*» lnrr- — {Q vrhich acoxues by 
reason-o£. the improper, irregular or negligent closing of the transaction 
oxr.wkieft;the Commitment or Policy is predicated. 
SECTION VII The AGENT shall not be the agent of the COMPANY for the service 
of summons or process upon the Company but the AGENT shall immediately notify 
the COKPANY at its Nome Office in Dallas, Dallas County, Texas, by registered 
mail of any attempted summons or other process upon it as agent of the 
COMPANY and the reason therefor, if obtainable. 
SECTION VIII Jt i-; .icrced that the AHOrr shall have no authority to r-jrt-
sent or in any way to act for the COMPANY in connection with any business or 
affairs of the COrtPANY other than title insurance, nor shall the AGENT have 
authority to change, alter or amend the terms of any Commitment or Policy 
forms supplied by the COMPANY, nor in any way to bind the COMPANY by *n/ 
representation, promise or otherwise, except in accordance with the tern-. 
and conditions of any Commitment or Policy issued on the forms of the COriPAvJY. 
The AGENT shall not net for the C0MPA..Y as escrow agent, trustee or financial 
representative for the collection, holding, impounding or disbursement of 
funds for any person, firm or corporation, nor shall it affirmatively hold 
out to the public that it has povcr -io to /»ct. The AGENT *\all be responsible 
to truKgwMPANY for £ny loss or dtrme^ e incurred -by the COMPANY because of an 
tmat&bdrittd act. 
SECTION IX The AGENT agrees to cooperate-with and assict the COMPANY an the 
handling And disposition of any claim mane under or in connection with any 
COWPl twsjut Otj-Policy issued hereunder. The AGENT shall have no right or 
authority to settle, ccnprmisp or dispose of any claim against the COCPAiJY 
except when specifically authorized to do so by the COUPAHY. The AGENT 
agrees to forward promptly to the COMPANY any and all communications, reports, 
a tat M M t* or ^ thcr writings or instruments pertaining to any claim reported, 
end to Xe*p~the COMPANY fully advised at all times with regard to any such 
claim. 
nexco. titnrr sucn party may cancel this contract by giving, by Registered 
Mal1
* 3Q day* notice of intention to cancel to the other party. 
The AGENT agrees that upon termination of this contract by ex-
piration or otherwise, it will lmnodiately renaer to the COMPANY at it* llomr 
Office in Dallas, Dallas County, Me.cas, on accounting of nil unpaid premiums, 
and will immediately return to the COMPANY all unused forms, blanks, supplies 
and unissued Commitment and Policy forms. 
This contract is not assignable by the /'GENT without the written 
consent of the COMPANY, and any sale or assignment made of the business of 
tha AGENT shall render this contract null and void. 
SECTION XI Mo amendment or modification of this contract, nor any supple-
mental contracts between the parties hereto, or agreement in conflict with 
this contract shall be valid, unless m writing and signed in the same formality 
as this contract is signed. 
SLCTIG:* XI1 The COMTANY agrees to pay to tne State of Utah the 
premium tax, if any, assessed against the full gross premium collected by 
the COMPANY pursuant to the Schedule of Rates attached hereto. The Aft^ JT 
agrees to pay all ottu»r tcr.es and fees of ^na^o/cx nature to -ny t«r*irg 
authority. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, these presents are signed and sen Is affixed 
on this the /j' j£> day of FPH&A/lf.* , 19 7Z~ 
ATTEST v -} US LIFE TITLE INSURANCE COTlPANY^W^/vLLAS 
'Ss<^*>2r S r c j o e t n r y 
ATTEST: GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY Of UTAH 
By: LtL<j,j£i-J #* t-srr/^i- By: / j ^ ^ w /^ 7 U^/c«o 
y Secrttaxv President etary 
